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INTRODUCTION
To date, investor-state tribunals have been preoccupied with a range
of issues revolving around the territorial application (territoriality) of in-
ternational investment agreements (IIAs). The importance, as well as the
various forms such issues take, has recently been highlighted in the deci-
sion of the Singapore High Court (SGHC) in Laos v. Sanum.1 In this case,
1. Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Sanum Investments Ltd.,
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the SGHC was asked by Laos to set aside an earlier arbitral award (in
Sanum v. Laos), filed by a Macanese legal entity and rendered under the
China-Laos bilateral investment treaty (BIT).2 In approaching the matter,
the SGHC set aside the award on the grounds that the China-Laos BIT
did not extend to Macao.3 This decision has provoked mixed feelings, as it
may weigh heavily against the territorial application of Chinese IIAs to
Hong Kong and Macao.4 At the same time, from an academic perspective,
the decision provides an opportunity to delve deeper into the territorial
elements inherent to jurisdiction ratione personae as this pertains to inter-
national investment law. Within this setting, this article seeks to provide a
conceptual framework for analyzing future investor-state arbitration dis-
putes under IIAs where similar territorial application issues may arise.
This article is nevertheless limited to issues of jurisdiction ratione per-
sonae.5 Therefore, the territorial nexus of investments, particularly as it
pertains to cases involving sovereign bonds, is not addressed in this arti-
cle.6 In addition, this article does not intend to address territorial issues
connected to the so-called nationality planning and treaty shopping tech-
niques7 as well as the various approaches followed in piercing the corpo-
2. Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments, China-Laos, Jan. 31, 1993, 1849 U.N.T.S. 109 [hereinafter China-Laos BIT]; Laos v.
Sanum, ¶ 2; Sanum Inv. Ltd. v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PCA Case No. 2013-13,
Award on Jurisdiction (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw3322.pdf.
3. Laos v. Sanum, ¶¶ 110-11.
4. For earlier comments proposing the application of Chinese IIAs to Hong Kong
and Macao, see NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES:
POLICIES AND PRACTICE 77 (2009); Nils Eliasson, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Hong
Kong, in ARBITRATION IN HONG KONG: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 903, 911-15 (Geoffrey Ma &
Dennis Brock eds., 2014).
5. See generally ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT
CLAIMS 284-327 (2009).
6. The issue of the territorial nexus of investments arises as one of jurisdiction ratione
materiae. See Abaclat et al. v. Argentine Republic (formerly Giovanna a Beccara et al. v.
Argentine Republic), ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
¶¶ 372-80, (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0236.pdf; Abaclat et al. v. Argentine Republic (formerly Giovanna a Beccara et al. v. Ar-
gentine Republic), ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Dissenting Opinion of Georges Abi-Saab,
¶¶ 73-119 (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0237.pdf. See generally JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 169-
72 (2010); MICHAEL WAIBEL, SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 209-251 (2011); Christina Knahr, Investments ‘In the Territory’ of the Host State,
in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009) (seeking to determine the rele-
vance of the territorial nexus in investment arbitration); Michail Dekastros, Portfolio Invest-
ment: Reconceptualising the Notion of Investment under the ICSID Convention, 14 J. WORLD
INV. & TRADE 286, 317-18 (2013); Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds
in International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 730-45 (2007).
7. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 313-17; LUIZ EDUARDO SALLES, FORUM
SHOPPING IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: THE ROLE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS 16-
46 (2014); Piero Bernandini, Nationality Requirements under BITS and Related Case Law, in
INVESTMENT TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES 2 at 17, 22-23 (Federico Ortino et al. eds., 2007);
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rate veil of foreign investors.8 To be more precise, while this article deals
with issues of jurisdiction ratione personae in general, it mainly focuses on
the nationality of legal entities to the extent it relates to the notion of
territory.9
IIAs typically protect natural or legal persons of one contracting party
(“nationals”) when investing in the territory of the other contracting
party.10 While the nationality of natural persons is governed “primarily by
the law of the country whose nationality is at issue”,11 the nationality of
legal entities is “more complex”12 with the most commonly used criteria
being those of incorporation, siège social (the main seat of business), and
effective control or a combination thereof.13 Depending on the case, the
Paul M. Blyschak, Yukos Universal v. Russia: Shell Companies and Treaty Shopping in Inter-
national Energy Disputes, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 179, 187-200 (2011).
8. See, e.g., TSA Spectrum de Arg. S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/5, Award, ¶¶ 140-47 (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0874.pdf; Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/
3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 328-33 (Oct. 21, 2005), http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0020_0.pdf; Tokios Tokelés v. Ukr., IC-
SID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 21-71 (Apr. 29, 2004), http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0863.pdf; ALBERT BADIA, PIERCING
THE VEIL OF STATE ENTERPRISES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 133-61 (2014); Markus
Burgstaller, Nationality of Corporate Investors and International Claims against the Investor’s
Own State, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 857, 871-77 (2006).
9. Particularly for natural persons, see, e.g., RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 45-47 (2012); RUDOLPH
DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 31-33 (1995); CHRISTO-
PHER DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION? 295-304 (2008); Maurice Mendelson,
Issues Relating to the Identity of the Investor, in 4 CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010 at 22, 22-32 (Arthur W.
Rovine ed., 2011); Katia Yannaca-Small, Who is Entitled to Claim? Nationality Challenges, in
ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY
ISSUES 211, 211-9 (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010).
10. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Gov’t of the People’s Republic of China and the
Gov’t of the Republic of Korea on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-S.
Kor., Sept. 7, 2007, art. 1(2) [hereinafter China-Korea BIT] (“The term ‘investor’ means any
natural person or legal entity of one Contracting Party who invests in the territory of the
other Contracting Party”).
11. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 45. For dual nationals, see, e.g., Nottebohm
Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Preliminary Objection (Second phase), (Judgment of
Apr. 6, 1955) I.C.J. REP. 1955, 4; Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/
20, July 14, 2010, Award, ¶¶ 54-81; Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. The United Arab Emirates,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, July 7, 2004, Award, ¶¶ 25-84; see also Mendelson, supra note 9,
at 27-28.
12. Mendelson, supra note 9, at 47.
13. See, e.g., Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 107-09 (Sept. 27, 2001) 6
ICSID Rep. 419 (2004) (“According to international law and practice, there are different
possible criteria to determine a juridical person’s nationality. The most widely used is the
place of incorporation or registered office. Alternatively, the place of the central administra-
tion or effective seat may also be taken into consideration.”); DUGAN ET AL., supra note 9, at
306-08; CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUB-
STANTIVE PRINCIPLES 142 (2007); SALACUSE, supra note 6, at 187-90; JESWALD W.
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International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes be-
tween States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) is also
relevant in defining the nationality of legal entities.14 In any case, territory
becomes vital; in fact a conditio sine qua non nationality cannot be estab-
lished at least for the cases of incorporation and/or main business activi-
ties.15 In this regard, it can be legally unclear when the word “territory” is
SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL,
AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 375-76 (2013); NOAH RUBINS &
N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RISK AND DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 137-39 (2005); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION 168-72 (2010); Pia Acconci,
Determining the Internationally Relevant Link Between a State and a Corporate Investor: Re-
cent Trends Concerning the Application of the “Genuine Link” Test, 5 J. WORLD INV. &
TRADE 139, 146-60 (2004); Bernandini, supra note 7, at 20-21; Engela C. Schlemmer, Invest-
ment, Investor, Nationality, and Shareholders, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 49, 75-79 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph
Schreuer eds., 2008); Yannaca-Small, supra note 9, at 224-42.
14. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, art. 25(2), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered
into force Oct. 14, 1966) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; ADC Affiliate Ltd. and ADC &
ADMC Mgmt. Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award, ¶¶ 332-62
(Oct. 2, 2006), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0006.pdf (declar-
ing the claimants nationals of Cyprus and determining that the finding does not contradict
the Cyprus-Hungary BIT); Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 214-24, 264-323 (Oct. 21,
2005) http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0020_0 (considering
whether the ICSID has jurisdiction over a corporation that is not a national of a particular
country, and interpreting what it means to be a national); Autopista v. Venezuela, ¶¶ 102-26
(discussing the meaning of nationality under the ICSID Convention and what jurisdiction
involves); Nat’l Gas S.A.E. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/7, Award,
¶¶ 122-49 (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw4043.pdf (considering the issue of nationality under the ICSID treaty, the objective test
of nationality, and whether the ICSID has jurisdiction); Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim
Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16,
Award, ¶¶ 326-31 (July 29, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0728.pdf (discussing the meaning of nationality under ICSID Art. 25); Tokios Tokelés v.
Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 21-52, 57-71 (Apr. 29, 2004),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0863.pdf (discussing nationality
under the ICSID award and ICSID jurisprudence with respect to nationality issues); TSA
Spectrum de Arg. S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5, Award, ¶¶ 140-47
(Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0874.pdf (dis-
cussing nationality under the ICSID award); Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt,
ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Summary Minutes of the Session of the Tribunal held in Paris,
886-89 (May 25, 1999) 41 ILM 881 (2002). See also CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, JU-
RISDICTION OF SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 474-85 (2009); Yaraslau Kryvoi, Pierc-
ing the Corporate Veil in International Arbitration, 1 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 169, 178-86 (2011)
(looking at various cases and jurisprudence under the ICSID Convention regarding the na-
tionalities of corporations).
15. This, however, may be different in cases of shareholding, which should not be con-
fused with these cases. For the issues stemming from shareholder claims, see generally DOUG-
LAS, supra note 5, at 397-457; DUGAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 315-39; MCLACHLAN ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 184-89; SALACUSE, supra note 6, at 181-84; KRISTA NADAKAVUKAREN
SCHEFER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 154-64 (2013);
VANDEVELDE, supra note 13, at 174-75.
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not adequately defined, as is exactly the case under China’s IIAs. In fact,
Chinese IIAs generally cover legal entities that are “established in accor-
dance with the laws of the People’s Republic of China and domiciled in
the territory of the People’s Republic of China,”16 “incorporated or con-
stituted under the laws and regulations of the People’s Republic of China
and have their seats in the People’s Republic of China,”17 or “incorpo-
rated or constituted in accordance with the laws and regulations of”
China.18 These references arguably create uncertainty as to whether they
16. Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments, China-Peru, art. 1(2), June 6, 1994, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/767 [hereinafter China-Peru BIT] (emphasis added). See, e.g., Agreement Con-
cerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Syrian Arab Repub-
lic, art. 1(2), Dec. 9, 1996, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/785
[hereinafter China-Syria BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments
(with Protocol), China-U.A.E., art. 1(2)(a), July 1, 1993, 1849 U.N.T.S. 254 [hereinafter
China-U.A.E. BIT]; Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection
of Investments, China-Viet., art. 1(2), Dec. 2, 1992, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/795 [hereinafter China-Vietnam BIT]; Agreement for the Encourage-
ment and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Greece, art. 1(3)(a), June 25, 1992,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/738 [hereinafter China-Greece
BIT].
17. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-
Belg.-Lux. Econ. Union, art. 1(1)(b)(ii), June 6, 2005, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/338 [hereinafter China-Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union BIT]
(emphasis added). See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
China-India, art. 1(a)(ii), Nov. 21, 2006, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/742 [hereinafter China-India BIT]; Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, China-Russ., art. 1(2)(b), Nov. 9, 2006, http://investmentpolicy
hub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/774 [hereinafter China-Russia BIT]; Agreement on the
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Spain, art. 1(2)(b), Nov. 14,
2005, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/780 [hereinafter China-
Spain BIT]; Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
China-Ger., art. 1(2), Dec. 1, 2003, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/Treaty
File/736 [hereinafter China-Germany BIT]; Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, China-Djib., art. 1(2)(b), Aug. 18, 2003, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/728 [China-Djibouti BIT]; Agreement on the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Investments, China- Côte d’Ivoire, art. 1(2)(a)(2), Sept. 30, 2002, http://investmentpoli
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/722; Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, China-Trin. & Tobago, art. 1(2)(b), July 22, 2002, http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/787 [hereinafter China-Trinidad & Tobago
BIT]; Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Myan., art.
1(2)(b), Dec. 12, 2001, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/762
[hereinafter China-Myanmar BIT]; Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protec-
tion of Investments, China-Neth., art. 1(2)(b), Nov. 26, 2001, http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/763 [hereinafter China-Netherlands BIT]. But see Agree-
ment on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Switz., art. 1(2)(b),
Jan. 27, 2009, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/783 [hereinafter
China-Switzerland BIT] (“[L]es entités juridiques, y compris les sociétés, les sociétés enregis-
trées, les sociétés de personnes et autres organisations, qui sont constituées ou organisées de
toute autre manière conformément à la législation de cette Partie contractante, et qui ont
leur siège, en même temps que des activités économiques réelles, sur le territoire de cette
même Partie contractante.”).
18. See China-Korea BIT, supra note 10, art. 1(2). See also China-Djibouti BIT, supra
note 17, art. 1(2)(b); Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
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refer to the siège social, the place of incorporation, or both.19 But most of
all, they reveal the direct bearing of territory to the nationality of “Chi-
nese” legal entities.20 Nevertheless, as this article shows, territory is not
adequately defined in the majority of China’s IIAs, thus creating doubts
regarding the application of IIAs to legal entities established, incorpo-
rated, and/or having their seat in Hong Kong and Macao.21
This article addresses the application of China’s IIAs to Hong Kong
and Macao, first, by examining the territorial application of China’s IIAs,
be they BITs, free trade agreements (FTAs) or multilateral investment
treaties (Part I). The article then proceeds by analyzing IIAs entered into
by Hong Kong and Macao (Part II). With this analysis in place, a clearer
picture develops of how territory is defined under the IIAs of China, Hong
Kong and Macao. At the same time, the uncertainty arising from the terri-
torial application of China’s IIAs will be fully documented, thus paving
the way for Part III, which examines certain aspects of treaty interpreta-
tion and other relevant considerations that will help clarify the notion of
“territory” under China’s IIAs. Such aspects of treaty interpretation are
ments, Alg.-China, art. 1(2)(b), Oct. 17, 1996, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/3288 [hereinafter Algeria-China BIT]; China-Laos BIT, supra note 2,
art. 1(2)(b); Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments
with the Exchange of Notes, China-Gr. Brit., art. 1(1)(d)(ii), May 15, 1986, 1462 U.N.T.S. 256
(“[C]ompanies means . . . in respect of the People’s Republic of China: corporations, firms, or
associations incorporated or constituted under the law in force in any part of the People’s
Republic of China.”). But see Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, China-
Mex. art. 1, July 11, 2008, 2626 U.N.T.S. 32 [hereinafter China-Mexico BIT] (“[i]nvestor of a
Contracting Party” means: . . . (b) an enterprise which is either constituted or otherwise
organized under the law of a Contracting Party, and is engaged in substantive business opera-
tions in the territory of that Contracting Party; having an investment in the territory of the
other Contracting Party”); Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, China-
Swed. art. 1(2), Mar. 29, 1982, 1350 U.N.T.S. 256 [hereinafter China-Sweden BIT] (“The term
“investor” shall mean: . . . In respect of the People’s Republic of China, any company, other
legal person or citizen of China authorized by the Chinese Government to make an invest-
ment.”). For Chinese BITs that include the element of “control” alternatively or in combina-
tion with the criteria of incorporation or seat of main business, see, e.g., Agreement on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Fr. art. 1(2)(b), Nov. 26, 2007,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3342; Agreement for the Promo-
tion and Protection of Investments, China-Kuwait, art. 1(2), 1(4), Nov. 23, 1985, http://invest
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/752 [hereinafter China-Kuwait BIT].
19. See, e.g., Yukos Universal Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227,
UNCITRAL, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 411 (Nov. 30, 2009):
[A]ccording to Article 31 of the VCLT, a treaty must be interpreted first on the
basis of its plain language. On its face, Article 1(7)(a)(ii) of the ECT contains no
requirement other than that the claimant company be duly organized in accor-
dance with the law applicable in a Contracting Party . . . The Treaty imposes no
further requirements with respect to shareholding, management, siège social or lo-
cation of its business activities . . . Companies incorporated in Contracting Parties
are embraced by the definition, regardless of the nationality of shareholders, the
origin of investment capital or the nationality of directors or management.
20. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 4, at 77; Bernandini, supra note 7, at 20-21.
21. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 4, at 81-82, 92-93.
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drawn from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)22 and
the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties
(VCST).23 Guidance is also sought from the China-UK and China-Portu-
gal Joint Declarations, the Hong Kong and Macao Basic Laws, the ICSID
Convention and the World Trade Organization (WTO) law as well as
China’s Notifications to the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG).
Parts I to III therefore set the foundational elements of the issue discussed
in this article. On the same time, they allow for an appraisal of the ele-
ments relevant in defining the territorial application of IIAs in general and
the territorial application of China’s IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao in
particular.
Part IV then touches upon the Sanum case at length. By way of intro-
duction, the article first briefly examines the Tza Yap Shum case, because
it is the first case that dealt with the application of China’s IIAs to Hong
Kong, albeit through the perspective of natural persons.24 Thereafter, the
remainder of this Part explains the Sanum case as it unfolded before the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
tribunal and the SGHC. The UNCITRAL tribunal and the SGHC came to
different findings, with the first opting in favor and the second against the
application of the China-Laos BIT to Macao. This disagreement in how to
apply territoriality in the China-Laos BIT allows for an objective and in
depth analysis of the unprecedented case before the SGHC and presents
an image of present day developments in connection with the application
of China’s IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao.
Furthering the discussion, Part V revisits the findings of the SGHC to
analyze its potential weaknesses. First, this is done through the examina-
tion of state practice on the territorial extension of IIAs. Secondly, and in
the same vein, this Part touches upon cases filed under pre-succession or
secession IIAs against successor or seceding states.25 Such cases mainly
involve Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The relevant treaty prac-
tice of successor and seceding states supports the inapplicability of Chi-
nese IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao. Furthermore, the examination of
cases filed under pre-succession or secession IIAs is of great practical im-
portance given that, at the time of writing of this article, two cases have
22. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, (en-
tered into force Jan. 7, 1980) (hereinafter VCLT).
23. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, August 23,
1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3 (1996) (entered into force on Nov. 6, 1996) (hereinafter VCST).
24. See Señor Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction and Competence (June 19, 2009).
25. For the distinct issue of succession to responsibility, see JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 181-87 (2013); PATRICK DUMBERRY, STATE SUCCES-
SION TO INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2007). See also Lighthouses Case (Fr. v. Greece),
Judgment, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 62 (Mar. 17); Gabcı́kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Sept. 25); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J.
Rep. 47 (Feb. 26).
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been filed against Montenegro and one against Kosovo under Yugoslavian
BITs26 and another case has been filed against Kazakhstan under the Ca-
nada-USSR BIT.27 Third, this Part revisits the reasoning of the SGHC
with regard to the temporal effect of the Exchange of Letters between the
Laotian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Embassy in Laos,
which was crucial to the court’s determination that the China-Laos BIT
was inapplicable to Macao.  Fourth, Part V revisits the legal nature and
effect on third parties of China’s Joint Declarations with respect to Hong
Kong and Macao, which has been utterly overlooked by the SGHC. Last,
this Part reverts to the burgeoning parallelism existent among Chinese
IIAs as well as between Chinese IIAs and IIAs concluded by Hong Kong
and Macao. Again, several aspects of this parallelism appear to have been
overlooked by the SGHC.
Finally, the conclusion discusses the implications that arise from the
pervasive ambiguity surrounding the application of China’s IIAs to Hong
Kong and Macao, and summarizes the findings of this article. On balance,
this article establishes that (in light of currently available data) the appli-
cation of China’s IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao is still not conclusively
determined, even after the ruling of the SGHC.
I. TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (IIAS)
China’s IIAs can roughly be broken into three categories, namely bi-
lateral investment agreements (BITs), bilateral free trade agreements
(FTAs) with investment chapters, and multilateral investment treaties. The
characteristics of these treaties differ depending on the timeframe they fall
into. In particular, Chinese BITs have been concluded from 1982 onwards,
and have undergone three main phases that in literature are commonly
described as the three generations of China’s BITs.28 This three-genera-
26. See CEAC Holdings Limited v. Montenegro, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/8 (regis-
tered on Mar. 20, 2014); MNSS B.V. and Recupero Credito Acciaio N.V. v. Montenegro,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/8 (registered on Dec. 6, 2012); ACP Axos Capital GmbH v.
Republic of Kosovo, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/22 (registered on June 4, 2015); see also Mon-
tenegro Rebuffs Investor Allegations, After Two Claims are Lodged in Relation to Aluminium
Venture, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION REPORTER, (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.iareporter.com/
articles/20140325_1.
27. See World Wide Minerals v. Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 16, 2013, Notice of Ar-
bitration of Dec. 16, 2013 (not public).
28. See GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 4, at 35-42; Norah Gallagher, China’s BITs
and Arbitration Practice: Progress and Problems, in CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT LAW: TWENTY YEARS OF ICSID MEMBERSHIP 180, 185 (Wenhua Shan & Jinyuan Su
eds., 2015); Monika C. E. Heymann, International Law and the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes Relating to China, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507 (2008); Lars Markert, Arbitration Under
China’s Investment Treaties – Does It Really Work?, 5 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 205 (2009);
Stephan W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation Investment Treaties of
the People’s Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73 (2007); Wei Shen, The
Good, the Bad or the Ugly? A Critique of the Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence in Tza
Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 55 (2011); Jie Wang, Investor-State
Arbitration: Where Does China Stand?, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 493 (2009); J.
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tion categorization is generally drawn based on China’s initial conservative
model (1982-1989), China’s accession to the ICSID Convention (1990-
1997) and on the “Going Abroad” strategy implemented from 1998 on-
wards, that granted access to investor-state arbitration (ICSID and non-
ICSID) for all kinds of disputes. On the other hand, China’s FTAs with
investment chapters first appeared in 2006, almost two decades after the
emergence of China’s third generation BITs. Likewise, China’s first multi-
lateral investment treaty was signed in 2009.29 These phases of China’s
investment treaty practice have greatly altered the form and substance of
Chinese IIAs and have also influenced the linguistic stipulations employed
for the notion of territory. Nevertheless, the following sections show that
the prevailing model or generation of China’s IIAs does not necessarily
determine the approach adopted in defining the notion of territory. The
matter is rather determined on an ad hoc and treaty-by-treaty basis.
A. China’s Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
As of today, China has concluded 130 BITs, making it one of the most
active states in the field of international investment lawmaking.30 A re-
view of the provisions pertinent to the territorial application of these BITs
reveals that there is no uniform approach to this issue. Generally speaking,
there are four main tendencies revolving around the treatment of territori-
ality in Chinese BITs:
• BITs that do not define the notion of territory;
• BITs that define territory but do not include any reference for
their application to Hong Kong and Macao;
• BITs that include a reference to Hong Kong and Macao without
specifically excluding their application to these territories; and
• BITs that specifically carve out Hong Kong and Macao from their
application.
The following sub-sections address each of these categories.
1. BITs that Do Not Define “Territory”
Although the majority of BITs that do not provide a definition of ter-
ritory can be traced back to the first generation of China’s BITs,31 it is
Romesh Weeramantry, Investor–State Dispute Settlement Provisions in China’s Investment
Treaties, 27 ICSID REV. 192 (2012).
29. Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Co-operation, ASEAN-China, Aug. 15, 2009, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/inforimages/
200908/20090817113007764.pdf [hereinafter China-ASEAN Agreement on Investment].
30. Eliasson, supra note 28, at 90-91; Nils Eliasson, Investor-State Arbitration and Chi-
nese Investors: Recent Developments in Light of the Decision on Jurisdiction in the Case Mr.
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, 2 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 347, 349-50 (2009); Shen,
supra note 28, at 56.
31. See China-Djibouti BIT, supra note 17, art. 1; China-Syria BIT, supra note 16, art.
1; China-Peru BIT (1994), supra note 16, art. 1(2); China-Laos BIT, supra note 2, arts. 1-2;
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vital to note that even some recent BITs concluded by China remain silent
in this regard. One prominent example is the China-Korea BIT of 2007.32
As it is later explained, this lack of clarity raises questions as to the inter-
pretation of the notion of territory in light of the definitions included in
other Chinese BITs.
2. BITs that Define “Territory” But Do Not Refer to
Hong Kong and Macao
Unlike the previous category, there exists a considerable number of Chi-
nese BITs that define the notion of territory but do not explicitly refer to
Hong Kong and Macao. However, even when defining territory, China’s
BITs treat the notion inconsistently. For example, the China-UK BIT of
1986 provides that it ”shall also apply to investments made by nationals or
companies of one Contracting Party in the territorial sea or maritime zone
or on the Continental Shelf where the other Contracting Party exercises its
sovereignty or sovereign rights or jurisdiction.”33 Similarly, but with direct
reference to international law, the China-U.A.E. BIT of 1993 provides
that ”[t]he term ‘territory’ shall be construed to mean, in addition to the
zones contained within the land boundaries, the maritime zones. The latter
China-Vietnam BIT, supra note 16, art. 1; China-Greece BIT, supra note 16, art. 1; Agree-
ment on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Malay., art. 1, Nov.
21, 1998, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3369 [hereinafter
China-Malaysia BIT]; China-Sweden BIT, supra note 18, art. 1. See also China-Myanmar
BIT, supra note 17; Agreement Concerning Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, China-Phil, July 20, 1992, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/769 [hereinafter China-Philippines BIT]; Agreement on the Reciprocal Encour-
agement and Protection of Investments, China-Pak., Feb. 12, 1989, http://investmentpolicy
hub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/766 [hereinafter China-Pakistan BIT]; Agreement on
the Promotion and Exchange of Investments (with Exchange of Notes), China-N.Z., Nov. 22,
1988, 1787 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter China-New Zealand BIT]; Agreement Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, China-Japan, Aug. 27, 1988, 1555
U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter China-Japan BIT]; Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, China-Sing., Nov. 21, 1985, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/776 [hereinafter China-Singapore BIT]; Agreement Concerning the Promotion
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (with Protocol), Austria-China, Sept. 12, 1985,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/179 [hereinafter Austria-China
BIT]; Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
China-Den., Apr. 29, 1985, 1443 U.N.T.S. 84 [hereinafter China-Denmark BIT]; Agreement
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Thai., Mar. 12, 1985, http://invest
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/786 [hereinafter China-Thailand BIT];
Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
China-It., Jan. 28, 1985, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3370
[hereinafter China-Italy BIT]; Agreement on Mutual Protection of Investments, China-Nor.,
Nov. 21, 1984, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/765 [hereinafter
China-Norway BIT].
32. See China-Korea BIT, supra note 10, art. 1.
33. Agreement Between the Gov’t of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Gov’t of the People’s Republic of China, China-UK, May 15, 1986,
art. 1(2) [hereinafter China-UK BIT]; see also Agreement on the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investments, China-Austl., art. 1(g), July 11, 1988, http://investmentpolicy
hub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/148 [hereinafter China-Australia BIT].
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also comprise the marine and submarine zones over which the Contracting
States exercise sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction under interna-
tional law.”34
Slightly more evolved, the China-Netherlands BIT of 2001 stipulates
that:
[T]he term “territory” means respectively: - for the People’s Re-
public of China, the territory of the People’s Republic of China
(including the territorial sea and air space above it) as well as any
area beyond its territorial sea within which the People’s Republic
of China has sovereign rights of exploration for and exploitation
of resources of the seabed and its sub-soil and superjacent water
resources in accordance with Chinese law and international law.35
Still other BITs directly refer to the exclusive economic zone. For instance,
the China-India BIT of 2006 specifically provides that:
“[T]erritory” means the territory of each Contracting Party in-
cluding its territorial waters and the airspace above it and other
maritime zones including the Exclusive Economic Zone and conti-
nental shelf over which the Contracting Party has sovereignty,
sovereign rights or exclusive jurisdiction in accordance with its
34. China-U.A.E. BIT, supra note 16, art. 1(6). See also Algeria-China BIT, supra note
18, art. 1(4). Cf. China-Kuwait BIT (1985), supra note 18, art. 1(6-7) (“The term ‘host govern-
ment’ shall mean the government of the Contracting State in whose territory and maritime
zones the relevant investment is made or is to be made . . . Maritime zones mean the marine
and submarine zones over which the Contracting States exercise, under international law,
sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction.”).
35. China-Netherlands BIT, supra note 17, art. 1(4); see also Agreement for the Pro-
motion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-China, art. 1(22), Sept. 9, 2012, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3476 (“the territory of China, includ-
ing land territory, internal waters, territorial sea, territorial air space, and any maritime areas
beyond the territorial sea over which, in accordance with international law and its domestic
law, China exercises sovereign rights or jurisdiction with respect to the waters, seabed and
subsoil and natural resources thereof.”); China-Switzerland BIT, supra note 17, art. 1(4);
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Colom., art. 1(4), Nov.
22, 2008, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/720; Agreement on the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Port., art. 1(4), Dec. 9,
2005, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3363 [hereinafter China-
Portugal BIT] (replacing the 1992 China-Portugal BIT); Agreement for the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Madag., art. 1(4), Nov. 21, 2005, http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/758 [hereinafter China-Madagascar BIT];
China-Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union BIT, supra note 17, art. 1(4); Agreement on
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Fin., art. 1(4), Nov. 15,
2004, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/733 [hereinafter China-
Finland BIT]; China-Trinidad & Tobago BIT, supra note 17, 145. 1(5); Agreement on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Jordan, art. 1(6), Nov. 5, 2001,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/748 (“The term ‘territory’ means
the territory of [Jordan] or the territory of the People’s Republic of China respectively, as
well as those maritime areas adjacent to the outer limit of the territorial sea, including the
seabed and subsoil of either of the above territories, over which the State concerned exer-
cises, in accordance with international law, sovereign rights and jurisdiction.”).
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laws in force and International Law including the l982 United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea.36
Finally, another definition that is found in BITs predating the latter two,
stipulates as follows: “The term ‘territory’ means the territory of each
Contracting Party as defined in its laws and the adjacent areas over which
each Contracting Party exercises sovereign rights or jurisdiction in accor-
dance with international law.”37
These definitions show a tendency towards a direct reference to inter-
national law when carving out the notion of territory. In addition, they
also capture the evolution of international law standards that took place
with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)’s en-
try into force.38 Indeed, Chinese BITs concluded after China’s ratification
of the UNCLOS make it explicit that the “term territory is not limited to
the areas which fall within the State’s sovereign domain,” i.e., not only its
land territory, internal waters, territorial sea and continental shelf, but also
“functional economic zones in which the coastal State is permitted to exer-
cise sovereign rights in accordance with international law.”39 This means
that territory also extends to the exclusive economic zone and in certain
cases to an extended continental shelf.40 Regardless, such functional eco-
nomic zones should be “established in conformity with international
law.”41 This point is particularly relevant for China’s maritime boundaries
36. China-India BIT, supra note 17, art. 1(d); see also China-Spain BIT supra note 17,
art. 1(4); China-Germany BIT, supra note 17, at Protocol ad. art. 2.
37. Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments, China-Maced., art. 1(5), June 9, 1997, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Down
load/TreatyFile/757; see also Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Pro-
tection of Investment, Brunei-China, art. 1(1)(b), Nov. 11, 2000, http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/514 [hereinafter China-Brunei BIT]; Agreement for the
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Cambodia-China, art. 1(4), July 19, 1996, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/571 [hereinafter Cambodia-China
BIT]; Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Indon., art. 1(6),
Nov. 18, 1994, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/743 [hereinafter
China-Indonesia BIT]; Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, China-Ice., art. 1(4), Mar. 31, 1994, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/741 [hereinafter China-Iceland BIT]; Agreement for the Protection and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Czechoslovakia, art. 1(4), Dec. 4, 1991, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/726 [hereinafter China-Czechoslova-
kia BIT] (“The term ‘territory’ means territory over which the Contracting Party has sover-
eignty and exercises its jurisdiction.”).
38. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. China ratified UNCLOS on June 7, 1996.
39. Nico Schrijver & Vid Prislan, The Netherlands, in COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED
MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES 535, 558 (Chester Brown ed., 2013); see also IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 108 (7th ed. 2008); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 487-90 (6th ed., 2008).
40. UNCLOS, supra note 38, arts. 55-85.
41. Schrijver & Prislan, supra note 39, at 558.
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in light of the ongoing South China Sea disputes.42 In any case, the above
definitions of territory remain silent with regard to Hong Kong and
Macao.
3. BITs that Refer to Hong Kong and Macao Without an
Explicit Carve Out
There exists only one Chinese BIT that makes an express reference to
Hong Kong and Macao without explicitly carving out these territories
from its application: the China-Mexico BIT. While defining territory simi-
larly to the majority of the BITs referred to in sub-section 2,43 the China-
Mexico BIT also includes a footnote stating that, “[a]uthorized by the
Central Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Governments
of Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions can separately
negotiate and sign the Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Pro-
tection of Investments with the Government of United Mexican States by
themselves.”44
This provision raises a wide array of questions. First of all, is it merely
an indication of Hong Kong and Macao’s ability to enter into their own
IIAs? Second, is the reference to separate negotiation and signature
meant to refer to the China-Mexico BIT and an extension thereof, or to a
potential Hong Kong-Mexico BIT or Macao-Mexico BIT? And how
would the latter option of a separate BIT be in conformity with the singu-
lar “the Agreement” used to describe the treaty after the verbs “negotiate
and sign”? Third, is the verb “can” indicative of an ipso facto application
of the China-Mexico BIT to Hong Kong and Macao absent separate BITs
between Mexico and the latter territories? Fourth, would the conclusion of
BITs between Mexico and these two regions—which to this date has not
taken place—exclude the application of the China-Mexico BIT, or would
this BIT still be applied in parallel? All the above questions merely pro-
42. See generally NONG HONG, UNCLOS AND OCEAN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: LAW
AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (2012); MARK J. VALENCIA, CHINA AND THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES (1995); Donald R. Rothwell, The 1982 Convention on the Law
of the Sea and its relevance to maritime disputes in the South China Sea, in THE SOUTH CHINA
SEA MARITIME DISPUTE: POLITICAL, LEGAL AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES 46 (Leszek Bus-
zynski & Christopher B. Roberts eds., 2014); Mark J. Valencia, The South China Sea Dis-
putes: Recent Developments, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE:
THE PROSPECT OF A JOINT DEVELOPMENT REGIME 3, 3-16 (Wu Shicun & Nong Hong eds.,
2014); James D. Fry & Melissa H. Loja, The Roots of Historic Title: Non-Western Pre-Colo-
nial Normative Systems and Legal Resolution of Territorial Disputes, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
727, 750-53 (2014).
43. China-Mexico BIT, supra note 18, art. 1:
“[T]erritory” means: . . . (b) in respect of the People’s Republic of China, the
territory of the People’s Republic of China including the territorial sea and air
space above it, as well as any area beyond its territorial sea within which the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China has sovereign rights of explorations and exploitations of
resources of the seabed and its subsoil and superjacent water resources in accor-
dance with Chinese law and international law.
44. Id. art. 1, n.1.
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vide a snapshot of the potential interpretative debates the footnote in-
serted in the China-Mexico BIT could provoke.
4. BITs that Specifically Carve Out Hong Kong and Macao
Only one BIT concluded by China explicitly carves out Hong Kong
and Macao from its application45: the China-Russia BIT of 2006.46 In
more detail, this treaty defines territory as follows:
The term “territory of the Contracting Party” means: - the terri-
tory of the Russian Federation and the territory of the People’s
Republic of China respectively; - maritime areas, beyond the ex-
ternal boundaries of the territorial sea of each of the above terri-
tories over which the respective Contracting Party exercises in
accordance with international law its sovereign rights or jurisdic-
tion for the purpose of exploration, extraction, exploitation and
preservation of natural resources of such areas.47
This definition certainly does not refer to Hong Kong and Macao, but
a relevant protocol to the treaty, reads as follows: “Unless otherwise
agreed by both Contracting Parties, the Agreement does not apply to the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of
China and the Macao Special Administrative Region of People’s Republic
of China.”48
The above provision makes it clear that the China-Russia BIT does
not apply to Hong Kong and Macao. This is different from the China-
Mexico BIT discussed in the previous section. However, the inclusion of
such an explicit carve out in only one Chinese BIT does not create cer-
tainty as to China’s intent to include Hong Kong and Macao within the
application of all its other BITs. In fact, as is later explained in the context
of the Sanum case, the China-Russia BIT could be used to argue both for
and against the application of China’s IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao.
B. China’s Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
China has already concluded ten bilateral FTAs, an FTA with the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and two agreements with
Hong Kong and Macao, known as Closer Economic and Partnership
Agreements (CEPAs).49 From these treaties, only five include an invest-
ment chapter. In particular, apart from the CEPAs with Hong Kong and
Macao, which do not contain investment chapters, China concluded its
45. See GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 4, at 94.
46. China-Russia BIT, supra note 17.
47. Id. art. 1(5).
48. Id. at Protocol.
49. The text of these agreements can be found online: http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english
/index.shtml (last visited May 9, 2015).
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first FTA with the ASEAN in 200450 and has since entered into bilateral
FTAs with Chile,51 Pakistan,52 New Zealand,53 Singapore,54 Peru,55 Costa
Rica,56 Iceland,57 Switzerland,58 Korea59 and Australia.60 From these
FTAs, only the FTAs with Pakistan, New Zealand, Peru, Korea and Aus-
tralia contain an investment chapter that also provides for investor-state
arbitration. The China-ASEAN FTA does not regulate investment, but
China and ASEAN have also entered into the China-ASEAN Agreement
on Investment, which is an eleven-party investment treaty discussed below
in Section C. With regard to the remaining agreements, the China-Chile
and China-Switzerland FTAs contain general references to investment,61
50. Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive
Economic Co-operation, ASEAN-China, Nov. 29, 2004, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/dongmeng/
annex/xieyi2004en.pdf. See also Agreement on Trade in Services of the Framework Agree-
ment on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation, ASEAN-China, Jan. 14, 2007, http://
www.asean.org/news/item/agreement-on-trade-in-services-of-the-framework-agreement-on-
comprehensive-economic-co-operation-between-the-association-of-southeast-asian-nations-
and-the-people-s-republic-of-china-2; China-ASEAN Agreement on Investment, supra note
29. These treaties established the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area that came into effect on
Jan. 1, 2010. For an overview of the agreements and their specific provisions, see http://
fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/chinaasean.shtml (last visited May 9, 2015). ASEAN is a regional
organization comprised of the following Southeast Asian countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Indo-
nesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
51. Free Trade Agreement, Chile-China, Nov. 18, 2005, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/chile/
xieyi/freetradexieding2.pdf [hereinafter Chile-China FTA].
52. Free Trade Agreement, China-Pak., Nov. 24, 2006, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/paki
stan/xieyi/fta_xieyi_en.pdf [hereinafter China-Pakistan FTA].
53. Free Trade Agreement, China-N.Z., Apr. 7, 2008, http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/gjs/
accessory/200804/1208158780064.pdf [hereinafter China-New Zealand FTA].
54. Free Trade Agreement, China-Sing., Oct. 23, 2008, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/
ensingapore.shtml [hereinafter China-Singapore FTA].
55. Free Trade Agreement, China-Peru, Apr. 28, 2009, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/bilu/
annex/bilu_xdwb_en.pdf [hereinafter China-Peru FTA].




57. Free Trade Agreement, China-Ice., Apr. 15, 2013, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/iceland/
xieyi/2013-4-17-en.pdf [hereinafter China-Iceland FTA].
58. Free Trade Agreement, China-Switz., July 6, 2013, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/
enswiss.shtml [hereinafter China-Switzerland FTA].
59. Free Trade Agreement, China-S. Kor., June 1, 2015, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/korea
/annex/xdzw_en.pdf [hereinafter China-Korea FTA].
60. Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China, Austl.-China, June 17, 2015, https://dfat.gov.au/
trade/agreements/chafta/official-documents/Documents/chafta-agreement-text.pdf [hereinaf-
ter China-Australia FTA].
61. See China-Switzerland FTA, supra note 58, arts. 9.1-9.2; Chile-China FTA, supra
note 51, art. 112:
Promoting Investment: 1. The aim of cooperation shall be to help the Parties to
promote, within the bounds of their own competence, an attractive and stable re-
ciprocal investment climate. 2. The Parties will promote the establishment of infor-
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the China-Singapore FTA stipulates that investment disputes will be gov-
erned by the China-ASEAN Agreement on Investment, to which Singa-
pore is party,62 and the FTAs with Costa Rica and Iceland stipulate that
investment will be governed by the BITs China has also concluded with
these countries.63 In fact, China has concluded BITs with each country it
has now entered into free trade relations with.64 Specifically, China has
entered into BITs with Chile,65 Pakistan,66 New Zealand,67 Singapore,68
Peru,69 Costa Rica,70 Iceland,71 Switzerland,72 Korea73 and Australia74
and also has entered into BITs with all the ASEAN states.75 In this regard,
it is of particular importance to note that the parallel existence of a BIT
and a FTA may also impact the territorial application of these treaties,
depending on the particular stipulations employed therein. This issue is
discussed later in Part V.
mation exchange channels and facilitate full communication and exchange in the
following aspects: (a) communication on investment policy laws, as well as, eco-
nomic trade and commercial information; (b) exploring the possibility of establish-
ing investment promotion mechanisms; and (c) providing national information for
the potential investors and on investment cooperative parties.
62. See China-Singapore FTA, supra note 54, art. 84.
63. See China-Iceland FTA, supra note 57, art. 92; China-Costa Rica FTA, supra note
56, art. 89 (“The Parties reaffirm their commitments under the Agreement between the Gov-
ernment of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Costa
Rica on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed in Beijing, on 24th October
2007.”).
64. Through a chronological perspective it must be noted that while these FTAs were
signed from 2004 to 2015, the corresponding BITs were signed from 1985 to 2001. However,
the China-Switzerland BIT of 1986 was replaced by the China-Switzerland BIT of 2009 and
the China-Korea BIT of 1992 by the China-Korea BIT of 2007. In 2007, China and Costa
Rica also signed a new BIT, but given that this has not yet entered into force, the applicable
treaty remains the China-Costa Rica BIT of 1999.
65. Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and the Reciprocal Protection of In-
vestment, Chile-China, Mar. 23, 1994, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/664.
66. China-Pakistan BIT, supra note 31.
67. China-New Zealand BIT, supra note 31.
68. China-Singapore BIT, supra note 31.
69. China-Peru BIT, supra note 16.
70. Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Costa Rica,
Mar. 25, 1999, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/842; see also
Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Oct. 24, 2007, http://investment
policyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/49/treaty/884 (has not entered into force).
71. China-Iceland BIT, supra note 37.
72. China-Switzerland BIT, supra note 17 (replacing the 1986 China-Switzerland BIT).
73. China-Korea BIT, supra note 10 (replacing the 1992 China-Korea BIT).
74. China-Australia BIT, supra note 33.
75. China-Myanmar BIT, supra note 17; China-Brunei BIT, supra note 37; Cambodia-
China BIT, supra note 37; China-Indonesia BIT, supra note 37; China-Laos BIT, supra note
2; China-Vietnam BIT, supra note 16; China-Philippines BIT, supra note 31; China-Malaysia
BIT, supra note 31; China-Singapore BIT, supra note 31; China-Thailand BIT, supra note 31.
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Having therefore identified those FTAs that contain an investment
chapter,76 the following lines focus on their stipulations with regard to the
notion of territory. First, the China-Pakistan FTA provides that it applies:
with respect to China, [to] the territory of the People’s Republic
of China, including land territory, internal waters, territorial sea
and any maritime areas beyond the territorial sea that, in accor-
dance with international law and its domestic law, China may ex-
ercise sovereign rights or jurisdiction with respect to the sea,
seabed and subsoil and their natural resources.77
This provision does not appear to differ from those referred to in sub-
section 2 above and therefore cannot provide guidance with regard to its
application to Hong Kong and Macao.
Turning to the China-Peru FTA, it is noted that this treaty also defines
territory almost identically but for one distinct difference. The China-Peru
FTA makes an explicit reference to the “customs territory” of China. In
more detail, the relevant provision reads as follows: “territory means: (a)
with respect to China, the entire customs territory of [the] People’s Repub-
lic of China, including land, maritime and air space, and the exclusive eco-
nomic zone and the continental shelf within which it exercises sovereign
rights and jurisdiction in accordance with international law and its domes-
tic law.”78 This reference to the “entire customs territory” of China is sig-
nificant, since it refers the matter of this treaty’s territorial application to
WTO law. And as discussed in Part III, under the WTO, the customs terri-
tory of China does not include Hong Kong and Macao. In this regard, a
legitimate question could be whether this reference to the customs terri-
tory of China should not ipso facto be applicable to the investment chapter
of this FTA, given that investment appears to be somewhat distinct from
the main bulk of the provisions included in a FTA. Regardless, the China-
Peru FTA appears to carve out Hong Kong and Macao from its applica-
tion. Nevertheless, the China-Peru FTA’s treatment of Hong Kong and
Macao is not conclusive for the China-Peru BIT, which does not even de-
fine the term “territory”.79
In the same vein, the China-New Zealand, China-Korea, and China-
Australia FTAs refer to China’s “customs territory” by providing that
76. See China-Australia FTA, supra note 60; China-Korea FTA; supra note 59; China-
Peru FTA, supra note 55; China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 53; China-Pakistan FTA,
supra note 52.
77. China-Pakistan FTA, supra note 52, art. 5(a). For qualified investors, Art. 46(3)(b)
covers “legal entities, including companies, associations, partnerships and other organiza-
tions, incorporated or constituted under the laws and regulations of either Party and have
their seats in that Party.”
78. China-Peru FTA, supra note 55, art. 5 (emphasis added). For qualified investors,
Art. 126(a) covers, among others, “economic entities established in accordance with the laws
of the People’s Republic of China and domiciled in the territory of the People’s Republic of
China”.
79. See China-Peru BIT, supra note 16, art. 1.
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these agreements “shall apply to the entire customs territory of China.”80
Again, the China-New Zealand and China-Korea BITs do not define the
notion of territory,81 while the China-Australia BIT provides a definition
that does not make any reference to Hong Kong and Macao.82 However,
the China-Korea and China-Australia FTAs contain two further references
that are somewhat confusing. First, Article 12.4 of the China-Korea FTA,
includes a most-favored-nation clause (MFN) that reads as follows:
Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party, and cov-
ered investments, in relation to the establishment, acquisition, ex-
pansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other
disposition of investments in its territory, treatment no less fa-
vourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors
and investments in its territory of investors of any non-Party.83
Nevertheless, a note to this Article provides that “the term ‘non-Party’
shall not include any separate customs territory within the meaning of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or of the WTO Agreement that
is a member of the World Trade Organization as of the date of entry into
force of this Agreement.”84 There is no denying that this note is meant to
refer to Hong Kong and Macao, as under the WTO regime both Hong
Kong and Macao are separate members of this organization, where they
retain membership as customs territories. The latter becomes apparent
when examining the note inserted in the MFN clause of the China-Austra-
lia FTA. While the MFN clause is identical to that of the China-Korea
FTA, the note inserted to the China-Australia FTA provides that “the
term ‘non-Party’ shall not include the following WTO members within the
meaning of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the WTO
Agreement: 1) Hong Kong, China; 2) Macao, China; and 3) Separate Cus-
toms Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei).”85
The above notes therefore appear to provide that, for the application of
the MFN clause, Hong Kong and Macao cannot be regarded as non-Con-
tracting Parties. However, this does not necessarily mean that Hong Kong
and Macao are to be regarded as parts of China, which undoubtedly quali-
fies as a “Party”. In fact, the China-Korea and the China-Australia FTAs
define territory as China’s “customs territory,” which arguably does not
80. China-Korea FTA, supra note 59, art. 1.5; China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 53,
art. 209(1). As to qualified investors, Art. 135 provides that “investor of a Party means a
natural person or enterprise of a Party who seeks to make, is making, or has made an invest-
ment in the territory of the other Party”.
81. See China-Korea BIT, supra note 10, art. 1; China-New Zealand BIT, supra note
31, art. 1.
82. See China-Australia BIT, supra note 33, art. 1(g) (“‘Territory’ in relation to a Con-
tracting Party includes the territorial sea, maritime zone or continental shelf where that Con-
tracting Party exercises its sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction.”).
83. See China-Korea FTA, supra note 59, art. 1.3(i).
84. Id. n. to Art. 12.4; see also art. 12.15, n. to art. 12.15.
85. China-Australia FTA, supra note 60, art. 9.4, n. to art. 9.4.
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include Hong Kong and Macao (a default rule). In this regard, the notes
inserted to the MFN clause are most likely derogations of this default rule.
The matter is nevertheless far from clear.
In any case, the stipulations employed in the above five FTAs indicate
that, with the exception of the China-Pakistan FTA which does not di-
rectly refer to China’s “customs territory”, these treaties do not appear to
apply to Hong Kong and Macao. However, this does not conclusively in-
form the interpretation of the respective BITs that China has also con-
cluded with its free trade partners.
C. China’s Multilateral Investment Treaties
This section touches upon the third category of China’s IIAs, namely
multilateral investment treaties. This category basically comprises two
treaties: the China-ASEAN Agreement on Investment and the China-Ja-
pan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement. The China-ASEAN Agree-
ment on Investment is an eleven-party investment treaty that was
concluded in 2009 between China and the ASEAN,86 while the China-
Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement was concluded in 2012.87
China has also concluded BITs with each and every ASEAN state88 as
well as with Japan and Korea.89 As shown above, China has recently also
entered into a FTA with Korea that contains an investment chapter.90
1. The China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement
The China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement does not
provide for a definition of territory. Remarkably, neither the China-Korea
nor the China-Japan BITs define this notion.91 However, the China-Korea
FTA defines territory as China’s “customs territory”. In other words, the
China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement defines a covered in-
vestor as “a natural person or an enterprise of a Contracting Party that
makes investments in the territory of another Contracting Party” without
elaborating any further on the notion of territory.92 There are, however,
some other provisions of this treaty that are of particular importance.
Most notably, Article 4, which may be regarded as a classic stipulation of a
most-favored-nation clause (MFN) reads as follows:
86. China-ASEAN Agreement on Investment, supra note 29.
87. Agreement for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment, China-
Japan-S. Kor. May 13, 2012, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/
2633 [hereinafter China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement].
88. See China-Myanmar BIT, supra note 17; China-Brunei BIT, supra note 37; Cam-
bodia-China BIT, supra note 37; China-Indonesia BIT, supra note 37; China-Laos BIT, supra
note 2; China-Vietnam BIT, supra note 16; China-Philippines BIT, supra note 31; China-
Malaysia BIT, supra note 31; China-Singapore BIT, supra note 31; China-Thailand BIT,
supra note 31.
89. China-Korea BIT, supra note 10; China-Japan BIT, supra note 31.
90. China-Korea FTA, supra note 59.
91. See China-Korea BIT, supra note 10, art. 1; China-Japan BIT, supra note 31, art. 1.
92. China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement, supra note 87, art. 1(2).
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Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investors of
another Contracting Party and to their investments treatment no
less favorable than that it accords in like circumstances to inves-
tors of the third Contracting Party or of a non-Contracting Party
and to their investments with respect to investment activities and
the matters relating to the admission of investment in accordance
with paragraph 2 of Article 2.93
Similarly, however, to the China-Korea and China-Australia FTAs, a note
to this Article provides that “the term ‘non-Contracting Parties’ shall not
include any separate customs territory within the meaning of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or of the WTO Agreement that is a mem-
ber of the World Trade Organization as of the date of entry into force of
this Agreement.”94 Again, the arguments advanced in the context of the
China-Korea and China-Australia FTAs should be applied mutatis mutan-
dis. That is, for the application of the MFN clause, Hong Kong and Macao
cannot be regarded as non-Contracting Parties, without this necessarily
meaning that Hong Kong and Macao are parts of China, which undoubt-
edly qualifies as a “Contracting Party” or otherwise “the third Party.” In
any case, unlike the China-Korea and China-Australia FTAs which pro-
vide for a default definition of territory, that of China’s “customs terri-
tory”, the China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement does not
provide for a definition of territory. Thus, the note to the MFN clause
could be interpreted as an expression of the treaty’s territorial inclusion of
Hong Kong and Macao.
Similarly, the note inserted in Article 22, which contains a “denial of
benefits” clause,95 provides that “‘non-Contracting Parties’ shall not in-
clude any separate customs territory”.96 However, given the interpretative
issues that have arisen regarding the denial of benefits clause,97 as well as
93. Id. art. 4(1).
94. Id. n.art. 4.
95. Id. art. 22:
1. A Contracting Party may deny the benefits of this Agreement to an investor of
another Contracting Party that is an enterprise of the latter Contracting Party and
to its investments if the enterprise is owned or controlled by an investor of a non-
Contracting Party and the denying Contracting Party: (a) does not maintain nor-
mal economic relations with the non-Contracting Party; or (b) adopts or maintains
measures with respect to the non-Contracting Party that prohibit transactions with
the enterprise or that would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of this
Agreement were accorded to the enterprise or to its investments. 2. A Contracting
Party may deny the benefits of this Agreement to an investor of another Con-
tracting Party that is an enterprise of the latter Contracting Party and to its invest-
ments if the enterprise is owned or controlled by an investor of a non-Contracting
Party or of the denying Contracting Party, and the enterprise has no substantial
business activities in the territory of the latter Contracting Party.
96. Id. n.art. 22.
97. See, e.g., Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/
12, Decision on Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, ¶¶ 4.6-4.9 (June 1, 2012), http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0935.pdf; Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Re-
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the lack of a definition of territory in the China-Japan-Korea Trilateral
Investment Agreement, the note to this provision can also be regarded as
extending the application of this treaty to Hong Kong and Macao.
Regardless, perhaps another decisive provision is Article 25, which re-
fers to the relations of the China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment
Agreement with other investment treaties in the following terms:
Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations
of a Contracting Party, including those relating to treatment ac-
corded to investors of another Contracting Party, under any bilat-
eral investment agreement between those two Contracting Parties
existing on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, so long
as such a bilateral agreement is in force.98
In addition, a note inserted to this Article, confirms that:
when an issue arises between an investor of a Contracting Party
and another Contracting Party, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed so as to prevent the investor from relying on the bilat-
eral investment agreement between those two Contracting Parties
which is considered by the investor to be more favorable than this
Agreement.99
As already noted, China has concluded BITs with Japan and Korea that
remain in force, but similar to the China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Invest-
ment Agreement, they do not define the notion of “territory”.100 At the
same time, as the next part indicates, Hong Kong also has concluded BITs
with Japan and Korea. Could the above provision therefore be seen as also
referring to these treaties, in light of the note to Articles 4 and 22 on the
term of “non-Contracting Parties”? Or rather, does the combination of
Articles 4, 22, and 25 reveal the intent of the parties not to extend the
application of the China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement to
Hong Kong and Macao? Additionally, do the above provisions conclu-
sively exclude Hong Kong and Macao from the treaty or do they simply
deal with other issues, such as for the case of Article 25 with the parallel
application of at least the China-Japan and China-Korea BITs?
These and many other questions reveal that the territorial application
of the present multilateral investment treaty is not clear. The next sub-
section turns to the China-ASEAN Agreement on Investment and exam-
ines the approach followed therein.
public of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 146-51 (Feb. 8,
2005), 20 ICSID Rep. 262 (2005); Ulysseas, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, In-
terim Award, ¶¶ 164-92 (Sep. 28, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-docu
ments/ita1045.pdf.
98. China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement, supra note 87, art. 25.
99. Id. art. 25.
100. See China-Korea BIT, supra note 10, art. 1; China-Japan BIT, supra note 31, art. 1.
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2. The China-ASEAN Agreement on Investment
As noted above, the China-ASEAN Agreement on Investment was
concluded prior to the conclusion of the China-Japan-Korea Trilateral In-
vestment Agreement and is an eleven-party investment treaty between
China and the ASEAN states.101 This multilateral investment treaty, how-
ever, is distinct from the one examined above, as it appears to provide for
a clear definition of its territorial application. Indeed, Article 3, titled
“Scope of Application,” provides that this treaty:
[S]hall apply to measures adopted or maintained by a Party relat-
ing to: (a) investors of another Party; and (b) investments of in-
vestors of another Party in its territory, which shall be: (i) in
respect of China, the entire customs territory according to the
WTO definition at the time of her accession to the WTO on the
11th day of December 2001. For this purpose, for China, “terri-
tory” in this Agreement refers to the customs territory of China;
and (ii) in respect of ASEAN Member States, their respective
territories.102
This provision connects the territorial application of this treaty to the terri-
torial application of the WTO Covered Agreements and the WTO Agree-
ment to China, much like the FTAs with Peru, New Zealand, Korea and
Australia. And while the issue is touched upon in Part III, it suffices to say
that, under the WTO regime, Hong Kong and Macao are separate mem-
bers. Therefore, it appears that the China-ASEAN Agreement on Invest-
ment does not apply to Hong Kong and Macao.
In conclusion, this Part has indicated the approaches followed in
China’s IIAs, be they BITs, FTAs or multilateral investment treaties, with
regard to the notion of territory. The next Part now turns to IIAs con-
cluded by Hong Kong and Macao.
101. China-ASEAN Agreement on Investment, supra note 29. See generally Diane A.
Desierto, Investment Treaties: ASEAN, in ASIA RISING: GROWTH AND RESILIENCE IN AN
UNCERTAIN GLOBAL ECONOMY 184, 199-202 (Hal Hill & Maria Socorro Gochoco-Bautista
eds., 2013); Yap Lai Peng, The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 2009: Its
Objectives, Plans and Progress, in ASEAN: LIFE AFTER THE CHARTER 100, 100-12 (S. Tiwari
ed., 2010); Lin Chun Hung, ASEAN Charter: Deeper Regional Integration under International
Law?, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 821, 822-29 (2010); Wei Shen, Is this a Great Leap Forward? A
Comparative Review of the Investor-State Arbitration Clause in the ASEAN-China Investment
Treaty: From BIT Jurisprudential and Practical Perspectives, 27 J. INT’L ARB. 379, 380-82
(2010).
102. China-ASEAN Agreement on Investment, supra note 29, art. 3(1). For covered
investors, see id. art. 1:
(e) ‘investor of a Party’ means a natural person of a Party or a juridical person of a
Party that is making or has made an investment in the territories of the other
Parties; (f) ‘juridical person of a Party’ means any legal entity duly constituted or
otherwise organised under the applicable law of a Party, whether for profit or oth-
erwise, and whether privately-owned or governmentally-owned, and engaged in
substantive business operations in the territory of that Party, including any corpo-
ration, trust, partnership, joint venture, sole proprietorship or association.
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II. TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HONG KONG AND MACAO IIAS
While both Hong Kong and Macao are Special Administrative Re-
gions (SARs) of China, they nevertheless can enter into some interna-
tional treaties, including international trade and investment
agreements.103 Both Hong Kong and Macao have entered into binding
IIAs, independently of China.
In particular, Hong Kong has concluded 17 BITs and has entered into
three FTAs, in addition to the CEPA it retains with China.104 Of these
FTAs, only the Hong Kong-EFTA FTA contains investment provisions,
103. See ANTONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 64-88 (3d ed. 2013).
104. See Free Trade Agreement, Chile-China-Hong Kong, Sept. 7, 2012, https://
www.tid.gov.hk/english/trade_relations/hkclfta/text_agreement.html; Agreement for the Pro-
motion and Protection of Investments, H.K.-Kuwait, May 13, 2010 [hereinafter Hong Kong-
Kuwait BIT]; Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, H.K.-N.Z., Mar. 29, 2010, http://
www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-agreement/hongkong/NZ-HK%20CEP-final-copy1.pdf;
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Fin.-H.K., July 2, 2009, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3177 [hereinafter Finland-Hong Kong
BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, H.K.-Thai., Nov. 19,
2005, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1521 [hereinafter Hong
Kong-Thailand BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, H.K.-
U.K., July 30, 1998, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1522 [here-
inafter Hong Kong-U.K. BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
H.K.-S. Kor., June 30, 1997, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1516
[hereinafter Hong Kong-Korea BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ment, H.K.-Japan, May 15, 1997, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/1515 [hereinafter Hong Kong-Japan BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investments, Austria-H.K., Oct. 11, 1996, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/190 [hereinafter Austria-Hong Kong BIT]; Agreement for the Promo-
tion and Protection of Investments, Belg.-H.K.-Lux., Oct. 7, 1996, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/367 [hereinafter Belgium-Luxembourg-Hong Kong
BIT]; Agreement for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-
H.K., Jan. 31, 1996, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1339 [here-
inafter Germany-Hong Kong BIT]; Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection
of Investments, Fr.-H.K., Nov. 30, 1995, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/1229 [hereinafter France-Hong Kong BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, H.K.-It., Nov. 28, 1995, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/1514 [hereinafter Hong Kong-Italy BIT]; Agreement on the Promotion
and Protection of Investments, H.K.-N.Z., July 6, 1995, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1518 [hereinafter Hong Kong-New Zealand BIT];
Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, H.K.-Switz., Sept.
22, 1994, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1520 [hereinafter Hong
Kong-Switzerland BIT]; Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, H.K.-
Swed., May 27, 1994, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1519 [here-
inafter Hong Kong-Sweden BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments, Den.-H.K., Feb. 2, 1994, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/
1007 [hereinafter Denmark-Hong Kong BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection
of Investments, Austl.-H.K., Sept. 15, 1993, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/152 [hereinafter Australia-Hong Kong BIT]; Agreement on the En-
couragement and Protection of Investments, H.K.-Neth., Nov. 19, 1992, http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1517 [hereinafter Hong Kong-Netherlands
BIT]. See also Free Trade Agreement, EFTA-H.K., June 21, 2011 (entered into force Oct. 1,
2012 for Hong Kong, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland, and entered into force Nov. 1,
2012 for Norway) [hereinafter EFTA-Hong Kong FTA].
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although it does not provide for an investor-state arbitration mecha-
nism.105 It is nevertheless important to examine this treaty due to the fact
that it addresses issues of territorial application. Macao, by contrast, has
only concluded two BITs, with Portugal and the Netherlands.106
The next sections focus on these treaties but before that, it remains
important to note two issues. First, China has concluded IIAs with each
and every state with which both Hong Kong and Macao have entered into
IIAs.107 Second, as it is later underscored, the majority of Hong Kong’s
BITs have been negotiated and concluded by the Sino-British Joint Liai-
son Group that was set up by the 1984 China-UK Joint Declaration lead-
ing to the 1997 handover.108
A. Hong Kong IIAs
1. Hong Kong BITs
Hong Kong BITs typically employ the term “area” instead of “terri-
tory” but there appears to be no significant difference between these two
terms. Therefore, covered investors are typically physical persons or com-
panies,109 with the latter being conceived “in respect of Hong Kong” as
corporations, partnerships, associations, trusts or other legally
recognised entities incorporated or constituted or otherwise duly
organised under the law in force in its area or under the law of a
non-Contracting Party and owned or controlled by entities de-
scribed in this sub-paragraph or by physical persons who have the
right of abode in its area, regardless of whether or not the entities
referred to in this sub-paragraph are organised for pecuniary gain,
privately or otherwise owned, or organised with limited or unlim-
ited liability.110
105. See EFTA-Hong Kong FTA, Ch. 4.
106. Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Mac.-
Port., May 17, 2000, B.O. n.°: 31, Ser. 1, 2000/7/24, 2453 (Port.) (entered into force May 2,
2002) [hereinafter Macao-Portugal BIT; Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Pro-
tection of Investment, Mac.-Neth., May 22, 2008, 2609 U.N.T.S. 49 (entered into force May 1,
2009) [hereinafter Macao-Netherlands BIT].
107. See China-Australia FTA, supra note 60; China-Korea FTA, supra note 59; China-
Switzerland BIT, supra note 17; China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 53; China-Korea BIT,
supra note 10; China-Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union BIT, supra 17; China-Finland
BIT, supra note 35; China-Germany BIT, supra note 17; China-Netherlands BIT, supra note
17; China-New Zealand BIT, supra note 31; China-Japan BIT, supra note 31; China-Australia
BIT, supra note 33; China-Denmark BIT, supra note 31; China-Thailand BIT, supra note 31;
China-Italy BIT, supra note 31; China-Sweden BIT, supra note 18; see also China-Portugal
BIT, supra note 35.
108. In fact, eleven out of seventeen BITs concluded by Hong Kong have been negoti-
ated by the Sino-British Liaison Group. See China-UK Joint Declaration, ¶ 5, and Ann. II;
Laos v. Sanum, ¶¶ 104-5; Affidavit of Sir Daniel Bethlehem (Oct. 3, 2014), ¶¶ 119-20, http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4408_Part1.pdf
109. Australia-Hong Kong BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(f)(i).
110. Id. art. 1(b)(i) (emphasis added). See also Hong Kong-Kuwait BIT, supra note 104,
art. 1(f); Finland-Hong Kong BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(d); Hong Kong-Thailand BIT, supra
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In turn, the term “area” is defined as follows: “‘area’: (i) in respect of
Hong Kong includes Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territo-
ries[.]”111 It thus seems abundantly clear that the territorial application of
Hong Kong BITs only covers the aforementioned territories and therefore
does not extend to the territory of the People’s Republic of China. This
fact, however, does not answer whether China’s IIAs can—or do—apply
to Hong Kong.
2. The EFTA-Hong Kong FTA
The EFTA-Hong Kong FTA is a five-party agreement among Hong
Kong, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and Norway. While this treaty
does not provide for investor-state arbitration, it nevertheless includes in-
vestment protection and promotion provisions, such as those typically
found in IIAs.112 In terms of its territorial scope, Article 1 provides that it
shall apply: “for Hong Kong, China: to the land and sea comprised within
the boundary of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region only, in-
cluding Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, the New Territories, and the waters
of Hong Kong.”113 This provision is essentially identical to that found in
Hong Kong BITs. However, in Chapter 4, which deals with Investment, it
is provided that this “Chapter shall be without prejudice to the interpreta-
tion or application of other international agreements relating to invest-
ment and taxation to which one or several EFTA States and Hong Kong,
China are parties.”114 A footnote at the end of this provision also states
that “[i]t is understood that any dispute settlement mechanism in an in-
vestment protection agreement to which one or several EFTA States and
note 104, art. 1(4); Hong Kong-U.K. BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(f); Hong Kong-Korea BIT,
supra note 104, art. 1(5); Hong Kong-Japan BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(4); Austria-Hong
Kong BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(d) (“‘investors’ means: (i) in respect of Hong Kong: –physi-
cal persons who have the right of abode in its area; –corporations, partnerships and associa-
tions incorporated or constituted and registered where applicable under the law in force in its
area.”); Belgium-Luxembourg-Hong Kong BIT, supra note 104, arts. 1(2) & 5; Germany-
Hong Kong, supra note 104, art. 1(4); Hong Kong-Italy BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(6); Hong
Kong-New Zealand BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(2); Hong Kong-Switzerland BIT, supra note
104, art. 1(2); Hong Kong-Sweden BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(2); Denmark-Hong Kong BIT,
supra note 104, art. 1(2); Hong Kong-Netherlands BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(2).
111. Australia-Hong Kong BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(a); see also Hong Kong-Kuwait
BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(a); Finland-Hong Kong BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(a); Hong
Kong-Thailand BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(1); Hong Kong-U.K. BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(a);
Hong Kong-Korea BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(1); Hong Kong-Japan BIT, supra note 104, art.
1(1); Austria-Hong Kong BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(a); Belgium-Luxembourg-Hong Kong
BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(1); Germany-Hong Kong BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(1); France-
Hong Kong BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(1); Hong Kong-Italy BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(1);
Hong Kong-New Zealand BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(1); Hong Kong-Switzerland BIT, supra
note 104, art. 1(1); Hong Kong-Sweden BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(1); Denmark-Hong Kong
BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(a); Hong Kong-Netherlands BIT, supra note 104, art. 1(1).
112. See EFTA-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 104, ch. 4.
113. Id. art. 1.2(1)(b).
114. Id. art. 4.1(2).
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Hong Kong, China are parties is not applicable to alleged breaches of this
Chapter.”115
In this regard, two points should be raised. First, the above provisions
clearly refer to other IIAs between EFTA states and Hong Kong, and not
other IIAs between EFTA states and China. Second, the only EFTA state
that retains a BIT with Hong Kong is Switzerland.116 In light of these re-
marks, it becomes evident that this treaty does not provide much guidance
with regard to the application of China’s IIAs to Hong Kong. The case is
similar to the two BITs concluded by Macao that are briefly discussed in
the next section.
B. Macao BITs
The two BITs concluded by Macao with Portugal and the Netherlands
define Macanese investors as “natural persons entitled to the Resident
Identity Card and legal persons constituted under the law of the Macao
Special Administrative Region.”117 Furthermore, the BITs also employ
the term “area” instead of “territory” and define “area” as including “in
respect of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Re-
public of China, is the peninsula of Macao and the islands of Taipa and
Coloane.”118 Similarly to Hong Kong’s BITs, these provisions do not pro-
vide any conclusive evidence on the non-application of China’s IIAs to
Macao.
Parts I and II have therefore established that the IIAs concluded by
China, Hong Kong, and Macao provide little guidance with regard to the
issue here examined. While it remains true, that a limited number of
China’s IIAs exclude, or at least appear to exclude, Hong Kong and Ma-
cao from their application, the issue remains moot for the majority of
these treaties. For this reason, the next Part sets out to examine whether
treaty interpretation and reference to other relevant considerations can
provide further guidance with regard to the application of China’s IIAs to
Hong Kong and Macao.
III. TREATY INTERPRETATION AND RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS
This part is broken into six sections. The first two focus on the Vienna
Conventions, and the others address, in turn, the China-U.K. and China-
Portugal Joint Declarations, the Hong Kong and Macao Basic Laws, the
definition of China’s territory under WTO law, the Notes of China to the
United Nations Secretary General (UNSG), and the territorial application
of the ICSID Convention.
115. Id. art. 4.1(2), n.16.
116. See Hong Kong-Switzerland BIT, supra note 104.
117. Macao-Netherlands BIT, supra note 106, art. 1(b)(ii). See also Macao-Portugal
BIT, supra note 106, art. 1(3).
118. Macao-Netherlands BIT, supra note 106, art. 1(c)(ii); Macao-Portugal BIT, supra
note 106, art. 1(2)(b).
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A. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
It is unanimously accepted that IIAs are international treaties. For this
reason, the relevance of the VCLT and the VCST discussed in the next
section is self-evident.119 However, what remains to be seen is whether
these codifying instruments can provide guidance with regard to the appli-
cation of China’s IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao.
1. Territorial Application Generally and with Respect
to State-Succession
The general approach of the VCLT with regard to the territorial appli-
cation of treaties is found in Article 29 and reads as follows: “Unless a
different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a
treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory.”120 That
is, under Article 29, the default position would be to apply China’s IIAs to
Hong Kong and Macao unless contrary evidence appeared “from the
treaty” (limb a) or “is otherwise established” (limb b).
However, as the Commentary and drafting history of the VCLT
reveal, the Commission decided not to deal with the impact of
state succession on “the territorial scope of a treaty” in light of the
separate study dealing with cases of succession of States, that
eventually produced the VCST.121 Article 42 likewise does not
address the issue of state succession on territoriality of treaties,
even though it addresses the validity and continuance in force of
treaties.122 Nevertheless, the Commission acknowledged “a
change in the legal personality of a party resulting in its disappear-
ance as a separate international person may be a factual cause of
the termination of a bilateral treaty.”123 Although state succession
119. See J. ROMESH WEERAMANTRY, TREATY INTERPRETATION IN INVESTMENT ARBI-
TRATION 4-12 (Loukas Mistelis ed., 2012); José Enrique Alvarez, The Public International
Law Regime Governing International Investment, 344 REC. DES COURS 195, 217-18 (2011).
120. VCLT, supra note 22, art. 29; MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 387-95 (2009). See PETER MALANCZUK,
AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (7th rev. ed. 1997);
PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 99 (José Mico & Peter Hag-
genmacher trans., 1995); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREA-
TIES 87-92 (2d ed., 1984); 1 THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A
COMMENTARY 731-63 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011); AUST, supra note 103, at
178-91; BROWNLIE, supra note 39, at 626-8; SHAW, supra note 39, at 925-26.
121. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, 2 Y.
B.Int’l.L.Comm’n., art. 25, ¶6 (1996) [hereinafter VCLT Commentary].
122. VCLT, supra note 22, art. 42:
1. The validity of a treaty or of the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may
be impeached only through the application of the present Convention. 2. The ter-
mination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of a party, may take place
only as a result of the application of the provisions of the treaty or of the present
Convention. The same rule applies to suspension of the operation of a treaty.
123. VCLT Commentary, supra note 121, art. 39, ¶ 5.
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constitutes a factual cause for termination of a treaty, it is not con-
sidered a distinct legal ground for terminating.124
In light of this, there is little that can be inferred from the treaties
examined in Parts I and II by utilizing Article 29.  The first limb of Article
29 that refers to a different intention appearing “from the treaty” is only
satisfied for those Chinese IIAs that specifically carve out Hong Kong and
Macao from their application, as is exactly the case in the China-Russia
BIT. It thus remains to be seen whether the second limb of Article 29 that
refers to what may otherwise be established can be of any further gui-
dance. Therefore, the next step is to look to Article 31, which provides a
toolbox for treaty interpretation.125 From this provision, it becomes clear
that an investor-state tribunal dealing with the territorial application of
China’s IIAs should take into account a subsequent agreement or practice
between China and the other state involved.126 This is particularly rele-
vant for the Laos v. Sanum case, where the SGHC had to determine the
bearing of an Exchange of Letters between the Laotian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs and the Chinese Embassy in Laos over the non-application of
the Laos-China BIT to Macao. As is later explained, the SGHC treated
these Letters as a subsequent agreement. However, it did so without ade-
quately explaining whether they constituted a subsequent amendment or
interpretation. For this reason, it is necessary to examine Chinese practice
relevant to subsequent modifications of IIAs.
2. Interpreting and/or Modifying the Territorial
Application of Chinese IIAs
At the outset, it is noted that a subsequent agreement under Article 31
of the VCLT may well be a joint interpretation of the contracting parties
to an IIA as well as a modification (amendment) thereof. In practice, in-
terpretation might be hard to distinguish from modification, especially
when the former is realized through the adoption of a separate instrument.
In theory, however, the distinction is important since an “interpretation
illuminates the meaning of the original text” and is “retroactive in effect,
whereas modification only has an effect for the future.”127 Of course, the
124. VCLT, supra note 22, art. 73; see also VCLT Commentary, supra note 121, art. 69,
¶ 3.
125. See generally Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Arti-
cle 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 279 (2005); Panos Merkouris,
Debating the Ouroboros of International Law: The Drafting History of Article 31(3)(c), 9
INT’L COMM. L. REV. 1 (2007).
126. See VLCT, supra note 22, art. 31(3) (“There shall be taken into account, together
with the context: (a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpre-
tation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) Any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation.”).
127. 2 THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 971
(Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011); see also Julian Arato, Subsequent Practice and
Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty Interpretation over Time and their Diverse
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contracting parties could also agree to impute retroactive effect to a modi-
fication of an IIA, but this is something that rarely occurs.128 In particular,
in Laos v. Sanum, the SGHC had to examine an Exchange of Letters be-
tween the Laotian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China’s Embassy in
Vientiane, Laos. Thus, a question of great practical importance was
whether such Exchange of Letters constituted an interpretation or an
amendment of the China-Laos BIT. The issue becomes of even greater
importance when considering that neither Laos nor China imputed retro-
active application to their Exchange of Letters. In fact, neither made any
indication of its temporal effects whatsoever.
This case brings to mind the 2001 interpretation of the NAFTA Free
Trade Commission (FTC), which involved the interpretation of the “fair
and equitable treatment standard” (FET).129 This interpretation prompted
a fierce debate over its temporal effect. First, the crux of that debate was
the proper interpretation of the FET standard under customary interna-
tional law prior to and after the FTC’s interpretation.130 The precise con-
tent of customary international law, however, was not defined in the
FTC’s interpretation.131 This left space for NAFTA tribunals to maneuver
and examine the evolution of the FET standard under customary interna-
tional law.132 Second, NAFTA tribunals did not find it difficult to identify
the interpretation of the FTC as a subsequent interpretation. But NAFTA
explicitly referred to an interpretation rather than a modification.133
Consequences, 9 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS & TRIBUNALS 443, 459-65 (2010); Anthea Roberts,
Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J.
INT’L L. 179, 213 (2010).
128. See VCLT, supra note 22, arts. 28 & 39; AUST, supra note 103, at 157-58; Shabtai
Rosenne, The Temporal Application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 4 COR-
NELL INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (1971); see also Nordzucker AG v. The Republic of Poland, Partial
Award, §§ 101-12 (Dec. 10, 2008); Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments (with Protocol), Ger.-Pol., Nov. 10, 1989, 1708 U.N.T.S. 323.
129. For the 2001 interpretation of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, see Arato,
supra note 127, at 462, n.66; WEERAMANTRY, supra note 119, at 140-43; Sergio Puig & Meg
Kinnear, NAFTA Chapter Eleven at Fifteen: Contributions to a Systemic Approach in Invest-
ment Arbitration, 25 I.C.S.I.D. REV. 258-59 (2010).
130. That mainly revolved around the evolution of the FET standard from the 1920s
whereupon the Neer standard was pronounced. See United States (LF and PE Neer) v. Mex-
ico, Docket No. 136, U.S.-Mex. Gen. Claims Comm’n, ¶¶ 4-5 (Oct. 15, 1926), 21 AM. J. INT’L
L. 555, 556-57 (1927).
131. See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Free Trade Commission,
Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions at B (July 31, 2001),
www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp.
132. See, e.g., ADF Group Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/1,
Award, ¶¶ 179-83 (Jan. 9, 2003); Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribu-
nal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Part II, Ch. B, ¶ 14 (Aug. 3, 2005), 44 ILM 1345; Mondev Int’l
Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 123-25 (Oct. 11, 2002);
Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Award in Respect of Damages, ¶¶ 52-66
(May 31, 2002), 41 ILM 1347 (2002). But see Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶
614 (June 8, 2009).
133. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1131(2), Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (“An interpretation by the Commission of a provision of this
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Reverting to the Exchange of Letters between China and Laos, this
article finds that it certainly constitutes a subsequent agreement under Ar-
ticle 31(3) of the VCLT. The crucial point, however, is whether it consti-
tuted a subsequent interpretation or a modification of the China-Laos
BIT. Note that unlike NAFTA, the China-Laos BIT does not explicitly
provide for joint interpretations, not to mention modifications. In this re-
gard, guidance can be sought in the practice of China when modifying its
IIAs. Especially for BITs, China typically concludes Protocols on the sign-
ing of the agreement. Such Protocols form an integral part of the agree-
ment and are usually signed by the same plenipotentiaries that concluded
the main agreement.134 There are also cases where such Protocols are
signed through an Exchange of Notes, but in those cases, heads of state or
competent ministers sign the Exchanges.135
Finally, similar official procedures are followed for Additional Proto-
cols that amend BITs well after their conclusion.136 These are nevertheless
different from the Exchange of Letters in Laos v. Sanum. At first sight, the
Exchange of Letters between the Laotian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Chinese Embassy in Laos suggests a departure from China’s practice
on the amendment of IIAs, thus making it more likely that the Exchange
of Letters is a case of joint interpretation. Such a conclusion, however,
requires the further clarification of two points. The first has to do with the
temporal effect of this interpretation, given that it took place after the
rendering of the decision in Sanum v. Laos. The second refers to the possi-
bility of treating the position of the Chinese Embassy in Laos as expres-
sing China’s general approach to the territorial application of its IIAs.
B. The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of Treaties (VCST)
As noted earlier, the study of the ILC Commission on the succession
of states culminated in the production of the VCST.137 While this instru-
Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this Section.”); see ADF v.
United States, Award at ¶ 177; Methanex v. United States, Final Award at ¶ 21; Methanex
Corp. v. United States, Partial Award, ¶ 101, 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005). But see Charles H.
Brower II, Why the FTC Notes of Interpretation Constitute a Partial Amendment of Article
1105 NAFTA, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 347, 349 (2006).
134. See e.g., China-Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union BIT, supra note 17; China-
Germany BIT, supra note 17; China-Netherlands BIT, supra note 17; China-Norway BIT,
supra note 31; China-Sweden BIT, supra note 18.
135. China-New Zealand BIT, supra note 31 (with the Exchange of Notes being signed
by the Prime Minister and Premier of State Council PRC); China-UK BIT, supra note 33
(with the Exchange of Notes being signed by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Com-
monwealth Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of the PRC).
136. See, e.g., Additional Protocol to the Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal En-
couragement and Protection of Investors, Bulg.-China, June 26, 2007, http://
tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/Nocategory/201002/20100206774607.html%3Cbr/%3E.
137. See Sari T. Korman, The 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Re-
spect of Treaties: An Inadequate Response to the Issue of State Succession, 16 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 174, 184-89 (1993); N. S. Rembe, The Vienna Convention on State Suc-
cession in Respect of Treaties: An African Perspective on its Applicability and Limitations, 17
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ment did not receive the widespread acceptance of the VCLT,138 it is nev-
ertheless an important codifying enterprise that is relevant to the issue
discussed here.139 However, prior to examining the most pertinent provi-
sions of the VCST, it is important to first refer to the cardinal concepts of
this “treaty on succession to treaties.”140 In particular, Article 2 provides
that:
(b) “succession of States” means the replacement of one State by
another in the responsibility for the international relations of
territory;
(c) “predecessor State” means the State which has been replaced
by another State on the occurrence of a succession of States;
(d) “successor State” means the State which has replaced another
State on the occurrence of a succession of States;
(e) “date of the succession of States” means the date upon which
the successor State replaced the predecessor State in the responsi-
bility for the international relations of the territory to which the
succession of States relates;
(f) “newly independent State” means a successor State the terri-
tory of which immediately before the date of the succession of
COMP. & INT’L L. J. S. AFR. 131, 131-32 (1984); James B. Stewart, Jr., Draft Articles on the
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties: The Pragmatic Development of International Law,
16 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 638 (1975); Renata Szafarz, Succession of States in Respect of Treaties in
Contemporary International Law 12 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L 119, 119-30 (1983); Renata Szafarz,
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties: A General Analysis, 10
POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 77, 77-78 (1980). See generally MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE DECOLONIZA-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATE SUCCESSION AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 64-79
(2009); STATE PRACTICE REGARDING STATE SUCCESSION AND ISSUES OF RECOGNITION 80-
117 (Jan Klabbers et al. eds., 1999); Giandonato Caggiano, The ILC Draft On The Succession
Of States In Respect Of Treaties: A Critical Appraisal, 1 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 69 (1975);
Mustafa Kamil Yasseen, La Convention de Vienne sur la succession d’Etats en matière de
traités, 24 Annuaire français de droit international 59 (1978). For works pre-dating the VCST,
see generally Thomas E. Atkinson, Succession, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867 (1954); J. Mervyn
Jones, State Succession in the Matter of Treaties, 24 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 360 (1947); D. P.
O’Connell, Independence and Succession to Treaties, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 84 (1962); Revo-
lutions, Treaties, and State Succession, 76 YALE L.J. 1669 (1967).
138. Compare UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Vienna Convention on Succes-
sion of States in Respect of Treaties, (1978), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-2&chapter=23&lang=EN (indicating the 22 states that
have ratified the 22 VCST), with UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties (1969), https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII
.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=EN (indicating
the 114 states that have ratified the VCLT).
139. Matthew G. Maloney, Succession of States in Respect of Treaties: The Vienna Con-
vention of 1978, 19 VA. J. INT’L L. 885 (1978-1979), 900-3; Photini Pazartzis, State Succession
to Multilateral Treaties: Recent Developments, 3 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 397, 398-99
(1998); Szafarz, Succession, supra note 137, at 130-32; Giandonato Caggiano, The ILC Draft
on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties: A Critical Appraisal, 1 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L
L. 69, 77-79 (1975).
140. Cf. Richard D. Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J.
INT’L L. 495 (1970).
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States was a dependent territory for the international relations of
which the predecessor State was responsible;141
From these provisions it becomes clear that when referring to the VCST a
distinction must be drawn, on one hand, between the successor state and
the predecessor state, and, on the other hand, between the predecessor state
and a newly independent state. This distinction might at first sight seem
delicate, given that a newly independent state is, in fact, a successor state.
Yet, the distinction entails considerable practical implications. In fact, a
newly independent state is a term coined to refer to all those states emerg-
ing from the decolonization period.142 Thus, a distinction was drawn be-
tween states that used to be dependent territories—be they colonies,
trusteeships, mandates, protectorates or the like—and other cases of state
dissolution or secession.143 The practical implications arising from this di-
vide are cardinal and are delineated below under subsections 2 and 3. It
suffices to say, however, that for the purposes of the VCST, the indepen-
dence of (among others) Malta and Mauritius, nations which used to be
dependent territories of the UK, is governed by the provisions relevant to
newly independent States.
On the other hand, cases of state dissolution or secession, such as
those of Czechoslovakia, the FRY and the USSR, are governed by alterna-
tive provisions. As is more fully shown below, Hong Kong and Macao do
not fall under either of these categories of states emerging from the
decolonization wave and other cases of state dissolution and secession. For
this reason, before delineating the divide between newly independent
states and not, subsection 1 touches upon the approach of the VCST with
regard to succession with respect to part of a state’s territory. That is pre-
cisely what happened with Hong Kong and Macao, to which China suc-
ceeded by virtue of its Joint Declarations with the UK and Portugal.
1. Territorial Application as per Succession in Part of Territory
Article 15 of the VCST is fundamental to the extent that it outlines
the default position to be followed in cases like the “handover” of Hong
Kong and Macao. In particular, Article 15 can be regarded as a special
expression of Article 29 VCLT, and provides as follows:
When part of the territory of a State, or when any territory for the
international relations of which a State is responsible, not being
part of the territory of that State, becomes part of the territory of
another State:
141. VCST, supra note 23, art. 2(1).
142. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties with Commentaries, art. 2, ¶¶ 6-7, YILC, Vol. II (1974) [hereinafter VCST Commen-
tary]; see also CRAVEN, supra note 137, at 131-46.
143. VCST Commentary, supra note 142, art. 2, ¶¶ 7-8.
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(a) treaties of the predecessor State cease to be in force in respect
of the territory to which the succession of States relates from the
date of the succession of States; and
(b) treaties of the successor State are in force in respect of the
territory to which the succession of States relates from the date of
the succession of States, unless it appears from the treaty or is
otherwise established that the application of the treaty to that ter-
ritory would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty or would radically change the conditions for its
operation.144
The above provision encapsulates the so-called “moving treaty-fron-
tiers” rule, which refers to cases “where territory not itself a State under-
goes a change of sovereignty and the successor State is an already existing
State.”145 However, a question that arises is whether the moving treaty-
frontiers rule applies ipso facto, or whether an agreement should be
reached between the newly acquired territory and the states that the suc-
cessor state retains treaties with. In this regard, the Commentary opts for
an “automatic process,” providing that:
Even if in some cases the application of the treaty regime of the
successor State to the newly acquired territory may be said to re-
sult from an agreement, tacit or otherwise, between it and the
other States parties to the treaties concerned, in most cases the
moving of the treaty frontier is an automatic process. The change
in the treaty regime applied to the territory is rather the natural
consequence of its having become part of the territory of the State
now responsible for its international relations.146
While the phrase “in most cases” before the almost disarming “automatic
process” and “natural consequence” might prompt doubt, it appears that
through the prism of Article 15 of the VCST, China’s IIAs would apply, by
default, to Hong Kong and Macao. Pursuant to this position, on the date
of succession, the British and Portuguese IIAs would cease to be in force,
and thus, China’s IIAs would apply to the territories of Hong Kong and
Macao. Moreover, the exact date of succession should be that of the
handover, as provided for in the Joint Declarations (discussed in the next
Section). In other words, the combination of Article 29 of the VCLT and
Article 15 of the VCST would as a default lead to the following:
• China’s IIAs, concluded prior to the succession of China to the
territory of Hong Kong and Macao, apply to these territories pur-
suant to Article 15 VCST.
144. VCST, supra note 23, art. 15.
145. VCST Commentary, supra note 142, art. 14, ¶¶ 1-2.
146. Id. ¶ 12 (emphasis added).
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• China’s IIAs, concluded after the succession of China to the terri-
tory of Hong Kong and Macao, apply to these territories pursuant
to Article 29 VCLT.147
Nevertheless, the default position articulated above may be rebutted if it
appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of
China’s IIAs to the territory of Hong Kong and Macao would be incom-
patible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change
the conditions for its operation. In this regard, recalling the findings of
Parts I and II, it appears that there is indeed a limited number of China’s
IIAs where “it appears from the treaty” that they are not applicable to
Hong Kong and Macao. In addition, a strict reading of Article 15 of the
VCST would also require proof that an application of such IIAs to Hong
Kong and Macao would be incompatible with their object and purpose or
would radically change the conditions of their operation. In any case, the
majority of China’s IIAs do not provide any guidance whatsoever. There-
fore, it would need to be “otherwise established” that applying such IIAs
to Hong Kong and Macao would be contrary to the agreements’ object
and purpose or contrary to the conditions of their operation. In turn, as
already discussed, the term “otherwise established” points to Article 31 of
the VCLT, which provides the general toolbox for the interpretation of
treaties.148
Focusing now on the Chinese IIAs concluded after the succession of
China to the territory of Hong Kong and Macao, Article 29 of the VCLT
provides that “a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire
territory” unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is other-
wise established.149 This provision appears to set a different threshold
than the one found in Article 15 of the VCST, since Article 29 of the
VCLT makes no reference to the object and purpose or to the conditions
of operation. Again, as later discussed, this point has not been adequately
addressed by the SGHC. Regardless, this prima facie difference can be
alleviated by reference to Article 31 of the VCLT, which, among other
things, refers to the ordinary meaning and the object and purpose of a
treaty.150 Such criteria run through the interpretation of treaties in gen-
eral, and the interpretation of the VCLT in particular, and are therefore
applicable to Article 29 of the VCLT. Thus, reference to Article 31 of the
VCLT alleviates the otherwise textual differences between Article 29 of
the VCLT and Article 15 of the VCST. In any case, under Article 29 of the
VCLT, the default position would be to apply China’s IIAs to Hong Kong
and Macao.
147. A third case are those IIAs signed by China prior to the succession but which
entered into force after that stage. The case is not dealt with by the VCST but guidance could
be perhaps drawn by VCST, supra note 23, art. 32. Perhaps more accurate in this case is the
application of VCLT, supra note 22, art. 29 in this case.
148. VCLT, supra note 22, art. 31.
149. Id. art. 29.
150. Id. art. 31(1).
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Thus, a finding that China’s IIAs did not apply to Hong Kong and
Macao would require evidence that the agreements were not intended to
extend to these territories. Such evidence could appear from the treaty, as
is the case with the China-Russia BIT, or could otherwise be established
by, among other things, a subsequent agreement or practice. The latter
case, and most importantly the temporal effect of a subsequent agreement
or practice, will be discussed in more detail in Part V. For now, the re-
maining subsections delineate the distinction the VCST makes between
newly independent states and other cases of dissolution or secession,
which may be analogized to the cases of Hong Kong and Macao.
2. Newly Independent States
The VCST encapsulates a divide between those states that emerged
from the decolonization process (newly independent states) and other
cases of state dissolution and secession that fall outside the ambit of
decolonization. In particular, with regard to newly independent states, the
VCST pronounces the tabula rasa (clean slate) principle,151 according to
which such states are not “bound to maintain in force, or to become a
party to, any treaty” of the predecessor state.152 In this line, with regard to
bilateral treaties (which makes up the majority of IIAs) and newly inde-
pendent states, Article 24 provides that:
A bilateral treaty which at the date of a succession of States was in
force in respect of the territory to which the succession of States
relates is considered as being in force between a newly indepen-
dent State and the other State party when: (a) they expressly so
agree; or (b) by reason of their conduct they are to be considered
as having so agreed.153
The default approach for newly independent states is that bilateral treaties
of the predecessor state do not apply in principle, unless there is an agree-
ment, expressly or by reason of conduct, that provides otherwise. How-
ever, in light of the completely opposite approach adopted by the
Commission with regard to state dissolution and secession, insofar as it is
outside the ambit of decolonization, the rationale underpinning the posi-
tion taken in Article 24 becomes interesting. In relevant space, the Com-
mentary to the VCST states that:
succession in respect of bilateral treaties has an essentially volun-
tary character: voluntary, that is, on the part not only of the newly
independent State but also of the other interested State. On this
basis the fundamental rule to be laid down for bilateral treaties
151. P. K. Menon, The Newly Independent States and Succession in Respect of Treaties,
18 KOREAN J. COMP. L. 139, 140-45 (1990); Stewart, supra note 137, at 639-45; Szafarz, Vi-
enna Convention, supra note 137, at 83, 89-90; see also Kenneth J. Keith, Succession to Bilat-
eral Treaties by Seceding States, 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 521, 521-22 (1967).
152. VCST, supra note 23, art. 16.
153. Id. Art. 24(1); see id. art. 17 for multilateral treaties.
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appears to be that their continuance in force after independence is
a matter of agreement, express or tacit, between the newly inde-
pendent State and the other State party to the predecessor State’s
treaty.154
This note, along with the very body of Article 24 raises considerable
doubts as to the justification of an alternative approach for cases not in-
volving decolonization.155
3. Dissolution and Secession of States
The practical implications stemming from the divide between newly
independent states and other successor states not falling within this cate-
gory culminates in Part IV of the VCST, which deals with the unification
and separation of states. In particular, Articles 34 and 35 deal with separa-
tion and are fundamental in understanding the completely opposite ap-
proach adopted for cases such as that of Czechoslovakia’s dissolution. In
more detail, Article 34 reads as follows:
1. When a part or parts of the territory of a State separate to
form one or more States, whether or not the predecessor State
continues to exist: (a) any treaty in force at the date of the
succession of States in respect of the entire territory of the
predecessor State continues in force in respect of each succes-
sor State so formed; . . .
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: (a) the States concerned other-
wise agree; or (b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established that the application of the treaty in respect of the
successor State would be incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions
for its operation.156
The above provisions adopt the rule of continuity, which is opposite to the
clean slate doctrine found in Article 24. It is nevertheless closer to the
approach of Article 15, which deals with succession in part of territory, as
is exactly the case of Hong Kong and Macao. In more detail, Article 34
provides that the IIAs (bilateral or not) of the predecessor state would
automatically apply to successor or seceding states unless one of the condi-
tions of paragraph two are met.
Patrick Dumberry has recently opposed this position by demonstrat-
ing that, at least in the context of BITs, state practice does not support
Article 34 of the VCST.157 The issue is referred to again in Part V, infra,
154. VCST Commentary, supra note 142, art. 23, ¶ 12. See also id. ¶¶ 14-15.
155. See infra at III.B.3.
156. VCST, supra note 23, art. 34; see also VCST Commentary, supra note 142, arts. 33-
34, ¶¶ 2-11.
157. Patrick Dumberry, An Uncharted Question of State Succession: Are New States Au-
tomatically Bound by the BITs Concluded by Predecessor States Before Independence?, 6 J.
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with the view of drawing an analogy with the case of Hong Kong and Ma-
cao, but it suffices to note that Dumberry has characterized the divide
between newly independent states and cases of dissolution and secession
as “incoherent and unjustifiable.”158
Lastly, when the predecessor state continues to exist, as is the case
with the BITs concluded by USSR, also referred to in Part V, the VCST
provides in Article 35 that:
When, after separation of any part of the territory of a State, the
predecessor State continues to exist, any treaty which at the date
of the succession of States was in force in respect of the predeces-
sor State continues in force in respect of its remaining territory
unless: (a) the States concerned otherwise agree; (b) it is estab-
lished that the treaty related only to the territory which has sepa-
rated from the predecessor State; or (c) it appears from the treaty
or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty in re-
spect of the predecessor State would be incompatible with the ob-
ject and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the
conditions for its operation.159
In other words, this provision suggests that, for example, the Canada-
USSR BIT is automatically applicable to the Russian Federation and to
(among others) Kazakhstan, unless one of the above conditions is met.160
This outcome is also heavily criticized by Patrick Dumberry.161
In summary, Article 15 of the VCST is directly relevant for the issue
here discussed, as is Article 29 of the VCLT. However, due regard should
be given to the “fine” textual differences of these Articles, as well as to the
exact scope of their application because the former is applicable to China’s
IIAs concluded prior to the succession of Hong Kong and Macao, as well
as the China-Laos BIT of 1993, and the latter to China’s IIAs concluded
after the succession of China to these territories. Certainly, the default
provision of the above Articles in favor of the application of China’s IIAs
to Hong Kong and Macao can be rebutted if it appears from the treaty or
is otherwise established. And while the first case is only applicable to a
handful of China’s IIAs, it still remains open, for the majority of China’s
IIAs, to examine whether it could otherwise be established that they do
not apply to Hong Kong and Macao.
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 74, 81-82 (2015); see also Milenko Kreca, Towards a New Perception
of Succession of States in Respect of Multilateral Treaties, 61 ANNALS FAC. L. BELGRADE
INT’L EDITION 5, 17-18 (2013) (discussing state practice regarding human rights treaties and
successor states).
158. See Patrick Dumberry, State Succession to Bilateral Treaties: A Few Observations
on the Incoherent and Unjustifiable Solution Adopted for Secession and Dissolution of States
under the 1978 Vienna Convention, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 13, 22 (2015).
159. VCST, supra note 23, art. 35; see also VCST Commentary, supra note 142, arts. 33-
34, ¶¶ 12-18.
160. See VCST Commentary, supra note 142, arts. 33-34, ¶¶ 19-33.
161. Dumberry, supra note 158, at 22, 89-93.
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C. Of “Handover” Joint Declarations and Basic Laws
Another important part of the discourse on the application of China’s
IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao are the China-U.K. and China-Portugal
Joint Declarations as well as the Hong Kong and Macao Basic Laws that
all demonstrate the one country, two systems principle. In particular, the
China-U.K. Joint Declaration for Hong Kong was signed in 1984 and
paved the way for the “handover” of Hong Kong to China on July 1,
1997.162 In relevant part, the Declaration provides:
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own,
using the name “Hong Kong, China”, maintain and develop rela-
tions and conclude and implement agreements with states, regions
and relevant international organisations in the appropriate fields,
including the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping,
communications, touristic, cultural and sporting fields.163
This provision has also found its way in the Hong Kong Basic Law along
with the main bulk of the provisions of the China-U.K. Joint Declara-
tion.164 In addition, the Declaration, and subsequently the Hong Kong Ba-
sic Law in substantially the same manner, provides that:
The application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of international agreements to which the People’s Republic of
China is or becomes a party shall be decided by the Central Peo-
ple’s Government, in accordance with the circumstances and
needs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and after
162. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong with Annexes, China-U.K., Dec. 19, 1984, 26 U.K.T.S. (1985) [hereinafter China-
U.K. Joint Declaration].
163. Id., Annex 1, art. XI (emphasis added).
164. See The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, art. 151 (adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh National Peo-
ple’s Congress on Apr. 4, 1990, promulgated by Order No. 26 of the President of the People’s
Republic of China on Apr. 4, 1990, and effective as of July 1, 1997) [hereinafter Hong Kong
Basic Law]. For Hong Kong’s Basic Law, see generally MAN-MUN CHAN (JOHANNES) & CHIN
L. LIM, LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION (2011); MING K. CHAN & DAVID J.
CLARK, THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR “STABILITY AND PROSPERITY”
UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY? (1991); HUALING FU, LISON HARRIS & SIMON N. M.
YOUNG, INTERPRETING HONG KONG’S BASIC LAW: THE STRUGGLE FOR COHERENCE (2007);
DANNY GITTINGS, INTRODUCTION TO THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW (2013); HONG KONG’S
COURT OF FINAL APPEAL: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN CHINA’S HONG KONG (Si-
mon N. M. Young & Yash Ghai eds., 2013); BERRY FONG-CHUNG HSU, THE COMMON LAW
SYSTEM IN CHINESE CONTEXT: HONG KONG IN TRANSITION (1992); HSIN-CHI KUAN, HONG
KONG AFTER THE BASIC LAW (1990); Johannes Chan, Hong Kong’s Constitutional Journey:
1997-2011, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 169,
170-93 (Albert Chen ed., 2011); Frank Ching, From the Joint Declaration to the Basic Law, in
THE OTHER HONG KONG REPORT 1996 33, 33-50 (Nyaw Mee Kau & Li Si-ming eds., 1996).
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seeking the views of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion Government.165
The above provisions dictate that China’s IIAs are not applicable to Hong
Kong unless a relevant territorial extension has taken place. The practice
of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group, set up by the 1984 Joint Declara-
tion, could likewise support this interpretation.166 This Group negotiated
and concluded a considerable number of international treaties, including
the majority of Hong Kong’s BITs prior to the 1997 handover.167 Argua-
bly, had the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group been of the view that
China’s IIAs applied to Hong Kong, it would have logically abstained
from negotiating and concluding BITs.
Nearly identical wording has also been employed in the China-Portu-
gal Joint Declaration of 1987, which paved the way for Macao’s handover
on December 20, 1999.168 Likewise, the Macao Basic Law reproduces the
wording of the Joint Declaration.169 However, unlike the Sino-British
165. China-U.K. Joint Declaration, supra note 162; see also Hong Kong Basic Law,
supra note 164, art. 153. But see Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 164, Annex 3(8) (“Names
or expressions in the laws previously in force in Hong Kong that are adopted as the laws of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall generally be construed or applied in
accordance with the following principles of substitution . . . In the case of any provision in
which any reference is made to ‘the People’s Republic of China’ or ‘China’ or to a similar
name or expression, such reference shall be construed as a reference to the People’s Republic
of China as including Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau.”).
166. See China-U.K. Joint Declaration, supra note 162, Annex 2 (establishing the Sino-
British Liaison Group).
167. This is based on a chronology of events: Compare the eleven out of the seventeen
BITs concluded by Hong Kong, which were negotiated by the Sino-British Liaison Group, to
the treaties that have been signed up until the handover.
168. See Joint Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and
The Government of the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macao, China-Port., Apr.
13, 1987, 1498 UNTS 229 Annex 1, art. VIII, [hereinafter China-Portugal Joint Declaration]
(“Subject to the principle that foreign affairs are the responsibility of the Central People’s
Government, the Macao Special Administrative Region may on it’s own, using the name
‘Macao, China’, maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement agreements
with states, regions and relevant international or regional organizations in the appropriate
fields, such as the economy, trade, finance, shipping, communications, tourism, culture, sci-
ence and technology and sports . . . The application to the Macao Special Administrative
Region of international agreements to which the People’s Republic of China is or becomes a
party shall be decided by the Central People’s Government, in accordance with the circum-
stances of each case and the needs of the Macao Special Administrative Region and after
seeking the views the People’s Republic of China.”).
169. See The Basic Law of the Macau Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China, adopted Mar. 31, 1993, arts. 136, 138 (effective Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter
Macao Basic Law]. See generally JIE HUANG, INTERREGIONAL RECOGNITION AND ENFORCE-
MENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FOR CHINA FROM US AND EU
LAW 77 (2014); Paulo Cardinal, The Judicial Guarantees of Fundamental Rights in the Macau
Legal System, in ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS - PERSPECTIVES OF
EVOLUTION 252, 252-58 (Jorge Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal eds., 2009); Yash Ghai, The Basic
Law of the Special Administrative Region of Macau: Some Reflections, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.
QUARTERLY 183 (2000).
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Joint Liaison Group, the Sino-Portuguese Joint Group did not conclude
any BITs.170
In a nutshell, the above instruments seem to disfavor an automatic
application of China’s IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao. In that sense they
appear to depart from the default provision under Articles 29 of the VCLT
and 15 of the VCST. However, two remarks should be made. First, the
China-U.K. and the China-Portugal Joint Declarations are nothing more
than two bilateral treaties, which, in principle, do not bind third parties,
such as Laos. Second, the Hong Kong and Macao Basic Laws that dupli-
cate the provisions found in the Joint Declarations remain nothing more
than national laws, i.e. part of China’s internal law.171 In this regard, Arti-
cle 27 of the VCLT would suggest that a “party may not invoke the provi-
sions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty.”172
D. The WTO Approach
The territorial application of the WTO Agreement and the Covered
Agreements to China is yet another important aspect of the issue here
discussed. In fact, the separate membership of Hong Kong and Macao to
the WTO could ab initio be treated as evidence against the application of
China’s IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao. In addition, China’s “customs ter-
ritory”—as per the WTO—has been employed in some of its IIAs in de-
fining their territorial scope.173 To understand the significance of this
approach, recall that, under the WTO regime, both Hong Kong and Ma-
cao are separate members, independent from China, since the WTO
Agreement enables both states and customs territories to become con-
tracting parties.174 Furthermore, upon the accession of China to the WTO,
the status of Hong Kong and Macao’s separate membership has not been
altered. Therefore, China’s “customs territory” does not extend to either
Hong Kong or Macao.175 This means that China’s IIAs that explicitly ex-
170. See China-Portugal Joint Declaration, supra note 168, Annex 2 (establishing the
Sino-Portuguese Joint Group). Note that before the handover, Macao did not conclude any
BITs.
171. For the international and domestic dimension of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, see GIT-
TINGS, supra note 164, at 37-46.
172. VCLT, supra note 22, art. 27.
173. See e.g., China-Australia FTA, supra note 60; China-Korea FTA, supra note 59;
China-Peru FTA, supra note 55; China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 53.
174. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, arts. XI,
XII, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994); see also General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, art. XXVI(5)(c), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994);
PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION 104-13 (3d. ed. 2013); Pasha L. Hsieh, Facing China: Taiwan’s Status
as a Separate Customs Territory in the World Trade Organization, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 1195,
1200-01 (2005).
175. See Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Decision of 10 November 2001
and Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China attached thereto, WTO
Doc. WT/L/432, at Part I (2)(A) (2001); see also Press Release/243, World Trade Organiza-
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tend to China’s “customs territory” do not apply to Hong Kong and Ma-
cao. Nevertheless, this is not conclusive for China’s IIAs that do not refer
to China’s “customs territory”.
E. The 1997 and 1999 Notes to the United Nations
Secretary General (UNSG)
China’s Notes to the UNSG could also be of relevance for the territo-
rial application of its IIAs. These Notes were delivered in 1997 and 1999
for Hong Kong and Macao, respectively.176 The purpose of these Notes
was to extend certain multilateral treaties to which China was a party at
that time to Hong Kong and Macao. Therefore, these Notes did not deal
with any of China’s BITs, given that these treaties are bilateral and not
multilateral.177 In particular, these Notes provide:
With respect to any other treaty not listed in the Annexes to this
Note, to which the People’s Republic of China is or will become a
party, in the event that it is decided to apply such treaty to the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Government of
the People’s Republic of China will carry out separately the for-
malities for such application.178
To this provision, the Note for Hong Kong also states that:
For the avoidance of doubt, no separate formalities will need to be
carried out by the Government of the People’s Republic of China
with respect to treaties which fall within in [sic] the category of
foreign affairs or defence [sic] or which, owing to their nature and
provisions, must apply to the entire territory of a State.179
This provision was nonetheless not inserted into the Note for Macao. Fi-
nally, both Notes mention that:
. . . . with regard to treaty actions undertaken by China [after 1
July 1997 for Hong Kong and after 13 December 1999 for Macao],
the Chinese Government confirmed that the territorial scope of
each treaty action would be specified. As such, declarations con-
cerning the territorial scope of the relevant treaties with regard to
[the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macao
Special Administrative Region] can be found in the footnotes to
tion, WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on China’s Entry, ¶¶ 3-4 (Sept. 17, 2001),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm.
176. See China’s Note to the UNSG of June 20, 1997 with Respect to Hong Kong [here-
inafter Hong Kong 1997 Note]; see also China’s Note to the UNSG of Dec. 13, 1999 with
respect to Macao [hereinafter Macao 1999 Note], https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Historicalinfo.
aspx (last visited May 10, 2015).
177. At that stage China had not concluded FTAs and multilateral investment treaties.
178. Hong Kong 1997 Note, supra note 176, ¶ IV; see also Macao 1999 Note, supra note
176, ¶ IV (containing substantially similar language pertaining to Macao).
179. Hong Kong 1997 Note, supra note 176, ¶ IV.
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the treaties concerned as published herein. Footnote indicators
are placed against China’s entry in the status list of those
treaties.180
The latter provision on the territorial scope of each treaty merely refers to
those multilateral treaties deposited with the UNSG. Nevertheless, the is-
sue is not entirely clear as to the provisions referred to above, which could
potentially be read to refer to both bilateral and multilateral treaties. In
addition, the provision that has only been inserted to the Note with re-
spect to Hong Kong, is of great ambiguity since it does not clarify which
are those treaties that “owing to their nature and provisions, must apply to
the entire territory of a State.”181 In this regard, it is important to highlight
that the UNSG acts as depositary of “open multilateral treaties of world-
wide interest” or “treaties negotiated under the auspices of the United
Nations regional commissions” but not of bilateral treaties.182
On the contrary, the UN Secretariat maintains a registry for “[e]very
treaty and every international agreement” that undisputedly includes both
multilateral and bilateral treaties.183 In light of the above, it appears that
the territorial status of China’s bilateral treaties was not dealt with in the
Notes addressed to the UNSG. In any case, the ability of China to apply
multilateral treaties to Hong Kong and Macao only if relevant formalities
have taken place should not go unnoticed. Whether the latter approach
also applies to bilateral treaties, such as China’s BITs, is another issue. In
any event, the position taken by China in the above Notes could be signifi-
cant for China’s multilateral investment treaties and in particular the
China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement and the China-
ASEAN Agreement on Investment. In connection to that, however, it
should not be forgotten that the UNSG does not act as depositary of such
treaties, although they certainly are multilateral.
F. The Territorial Application of the ICSID Convention
Finally, evidence supportive of the application of China’s IIAs to
Hong Kong and Macao can be found in the ICSID Convention. Article 70
provides:
This Convention shall apply to all territories for whose interna-
tional relations a Contracting State is responsible, except those
which are excluded by such State by written notice to the deposi-
tary of this Convention either at the time of ratification, accept-
ance or approval or subsequently.184
180. Id. ¶ 13; Macao 1999 Note, supra note 176, ¶ IV.
181. Hong Kong 1997 Note, supra note 176, ¶ IV.
182. UNITED NATIONS, FINAL CLAUSES OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES: HANDBOOK, at
6-7, U.N. Sales No. E.04.V.3 (2002).
183. U.N. Charter art. 102, ¶ 4.
184. ICSID Convention, supra note 14, at ¶ 70.
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Pursuant to this Article, the UK excluded the Channel Islands and the Isle
of Man from the application of the ICSID Convention but subsequently
extended its application to these territories.185 Relevant extensions were
also made for other overseas territories.186 Similarly, the Netherlands ex-
tended the ICSID Convention to the former Netherlands Antilles and Su-
riname, and Denmark extended it to the Faroe Islands.187 However, China
has neither excluded nor extended the application of the ICSID Conven-
tion to any territories. Therefore, the default position is that the Conven-
tion applies in respect of both Hong Kong and Macao.188 Nonetheless,
even if it can be established that under the ICSID Convention, Hong Kong
and Macao are regarded Chinese territory, this does not necessarily affect
the territorial application of China’s IIAs. That is why, the jurisdiction of
ICSID is not established by the mere ratification of the Convention, but
additionally requires the parties to consent “in writing.”189 Therefore, the
territorial application of China’s IIAs is crucial in this respect.
185. See Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) (Guernsey) Order 1968; Arbi-
tration (International Investment Disputes) (Jersey) Order 1979; Arbitration (International
Investment Disputes) Act 1983 (extending the Convention to the Isle of Man). The UK
signed the Convention on May 26, 1965, and ratified it on Dec. 19, 1966, and it entered into
force on Jan. 18, 1967. See “Database of Member States,” INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SET-
TLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/
Pages/Database-of-Member-States.bak.aspx?tab=utoZ&rdo=BOTH.
186. See Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act 1966 (Application to Col-
onies Etc.) Order 1967 (extending the Convention to numerous other U.K. territories, in-
cluding Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands,
Gibraltar, Montserrat, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, St. Helena, Turks and
Caicos Islands). For relevant arbitral practice see generally Southern Pacific Properties (Mid-
dle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 54, ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/3 (Apr. 14, 1988), 3 ICSID REP. 131 (1995).
187. See Designations and Notifications: Netherlands, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/
Pages/MembershipStateDetails.aspx?state=st98 (indicating the Netherlands’ extensions); see
also Designations and Notifications: Denmark, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Pages/Member-
shipStateDetails.aspx?state=ST40 (indicating Denmark’s extension); Signatory and Con-
tracting States: A-E, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Pages/Database-of-Member-States.bak.
aspx?tab=atoE&rdo=BOTH (indicating that Denmark signed the Convention on October
11, 1965, ratified it on April 24, 1968, and it entered into force on May 24, 1968); Signatory
and Contracting States: K-O, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Pages/Database-of-Member-
States.bak.aspx?tab=ktoO&rdo=BOTH (indicating The Netherlands signed the Convention
on May 25, 1966 and ratified it on September 14, 1966, and it entered into force on October
14, 1966).
188. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY
1276, n. 7 (2009) (“Hong Kong became a special administrative region of China on 1 July
1997 and is now covered by China’s ratification of the Convention. Macao, which was cov-
ered by Portugal’s participation in the Convention, is covered by China’s ratification since 19
December 1999.”).
189. ICSID Convention, supra note 14, art. 25(1); see also SCHREUER ET AL., supra note
188, at 85-87.
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IV. THE SANUM CASE EXPLAINED
This Part deals specifically with the Sanum case. The first Section of
this Part delineates rulings prior to the Sanum case, and particularly the
Tza Yap Shum v. Peru case. Thereafter, Sections B and C discuss the find-
ings of both the UNCITRAL tribunal in Sanum v. Laos and the decision
of the SGHC in the subsequent set aside proceedings.
A. Previous Rulings: Tza Yap Shum v. Peru
Tza Yap Shum v. Peru is the first investor-state arbitration filed by a
Chinese investor,190 and additionally the first ICSID claim brought about
under Chinese IIAs.191 While this case is not directly concerned with the
territorial application of China’s IIAs, it nevertheless is significant for the
issue under discussion. In particular, claimant was not a legal entity but a
natural person, who was a Hong Kong resident of Chinese descent and
born in China.192 Note that the nationality test for natural persons, unlike
that for legal entities, is somewhat detached from the notion of territory.
For example, the China-Peru BIT covers “natural persons who have the
nationality of the People’s Republic of China in accordance with its
laws.”193 This definition does not contain the territorial element found
190. See Señor Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction and Competence (June 19, 2009); Eliasson, China’s Investment Treaties,
supra note 30, at 94-96; see also Señor Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/6, Award (July 7, 2011); Señor Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/6, Decision on Annulment (Feb. 12, 2015). For the main highlights of the case, see
generally Eliasson, Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 30, at 367-70; Luke Nottage & J.
Romesh Weeramantry, Investment Arbitration in Asia: Five Perspectives on Law and Practice,
28 ARB. INT’L 19, 35 (2012); Wei Shen, supra note 28, at 59-63; Jane Y. Willems, The Settle-
ment of Investor-State Disputes and China: New Developments on ICSID Jurisdiction, 8 S. C.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 5-11 (2012).
191. Other cases under China’s IIAs include: China Heilongjiang International & Tech-
nical Cooperative Corp, Qinhangdaoshi Qinlong International Industrial, and Beijing Shou-
gang Mining Investment v. Republic of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, PCA (China-Mongolia BIT);
Ping An Life Insurance Company of China, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) Com-
pany of China, Limited v. Kingdom of Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29 (China-
Belgium-Luxembourg BIT); Beijing Urban Construction Group Co. Ltd. v. Republic of
Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/30 (China-Yemen BIT); Ekran Berhad v. People’s Republic
of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/15 which was suspended pursuant to the parties’ agree-
ment on July 22, 2011 (China-Malaysia BIT); Ansung Housing Co., Ltd. v. People’s Republic
of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/25 (China-Korea BIT). See also Philip Morris Asia Lim-
ited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12 (Hong Kong-
Australia BIT).
192. See Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, ¶60; see also Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 164,
art. 24 (discussing who is considered a resident of Hong Kong); The Interpretation by the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of
China (Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress at its
Tenth Session on 26 June 1999), http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_ind.nsf/CurEngOrd/
77E7FBB936DE3D71482575EE000DF62E?OpenDocument [hereinafter Interpretation of
Articles].
193. China-Peru BIT, supra note 16, art. 1(2).
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with regard to legal entities, namely “economic entities established in ac-
cordance with the laws of the People’s Republic of China and domiciled in
the territory of the People’s Republic of China.”194 Additionally, the na-
tionality law of China is applicable to Hong Kong and Macao and also
covers cases such as those of Mr. Tza Yap Shum, the claimant in the case
under discussion.195
In deciding the matter, the tribunal found that the nationality require-
ments for Mr. Tza Yap Shum had been met.196 However, this ruling did
not settle the territorial application of China’s IIAs, since it was concerned
with the nationality test of natural persons, which, as shown, does not in-
clude a territorial link similar to the one necessary in determining the na-
tionality of legal entities. In particular, the tribunal opined that:
Hong Kong’s ability to conclude its own treaties for the promotion
and protection of investments with countries with which China
also has entered into a BIT is not necessarily redundant. Histori-
cally, Hong Kong has hosted people from multiple nationalities. It
may be for this reason that the regional government has devel-
oped a policy that seeks to promote and protect investments in
third countries for the benefit of all its residents, regardless of
their nationality.197
Thus, the conclusion of a certain number of BITs by Hong Kong is by no
means conclusive as to its intention to carve out the application of China’s
IIAs. On the contrary, it is indicative of Hong Kong’s will to protect other
investors residing in Hong Kong and not falling under the scope of China’s
IIAs, i.e. non-Chinese investors. This ruling is significant, but does not
necessarily mean that it could be transposed to legal persons.
B. Sanum v. Laos: The Case Before the UNCITRAL Tribunal
The Sanum case unfolded in two phases, the first before the UNCI-
TRAL tribunal and the second in the subsequent set aside proceedings
before the SGHC. In brief, the Sanum v. Laos tribunal was the first inves-
tor-state tribunal asked to determine the application of Chinese IIAs to
legal entities incorporated and established in Macao. The cause of action
was the China-Laos BIT and the claim was filed by a Macanese legal en-
tity, Sanum Investments Limited.198 As noted above, the China-Laos BIT
does not contain a definition of “territory” but covers instead “natural
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. See Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 164, art. 24; Interpretation of Articles, supra
note 192; see also Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, ¶ 60.
196. See Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, ¶ 77.
197. Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, ¶ 76.
198. See Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Sanum Investments
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persons who have nationality of each Contracting State” and “economic
entities established in accordance with the laws and regulations of each
contracting State.”199 As Norah Gallagher and Wenhua Shan have sug-
gested, the use of the plural “laws” instead of “law” suggests that legal
entities established in China’s SARs are also covered investors.200 How-
ever, the tribunal did not adopt this approach, but instead went on to ex-
amine the major issues that were discussed in Parts I to III.
The tribunal first addressed China’s Note to the UNSG, second the
VCLT, the VCST, the China-Portugal Joint Declaration and the Macao
Basic Law and third the provisions of Chinese and Macanese BITs.201
With regard to China’s Note to the UNSG, the tribunal found that it
merely referred to multilateral treaties, and thus was not relevant for the
territorial scope of the China-Laos BIT.202 Having found so, the tribunal
then focused on Articles 29 of the VCLT and 15 of the VCST.203 How-
ever, unlike the SGHC, this tribunal was not equipped with any factual
elements that could help determine the application or non-application of
the China-Laos BIT to Macao, since “there were no affidavits from the
PRC, Laos or the Macao SAR, which could probably have been obtained
from the respective authorities.”204 In light of this remark, the tribunal
emphasized that the default position under customary international law
would be to apply the China-Laos BIT to Macao unless it could be estab-
lished that the BIT’s application would be incompatible with its object and
purpose205 or would radically change the conditions for its operation.206
As seen, these conditions are employed in Article 15 of the VCST and
are in line with the discussion advanced in Part III. At the same time, the
approach of the tribunal reveals the careful attention it has paid to the fine
textual difference of Articles 29 of the VCLT and 15 of the VCST. In
connection to that, it should be recalled that since the China-Laos BIT had
been concluded prior to the succession of China to Macao’s territory, then
Article 15 of the VCST is applicable instead of Article 29 of the VCLT.
This fine distinction appears not to have been considered by the SGHC.207
In any case, the UNCITRAL tribunal had to determine whether any of
the conditions referred to in Article 15 of the VCST were met. It thus
went on to examine the bearing of the China-Portugal Joint Declaration
and the Macao Basic Law. Eventually the tribunal ruled in favor of the
199. China-Laos BIT, supra note 2, art. 1(2).
200. See GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 4, at 92.
201. Sanum v. Laos, ¶¶ 205-300.
202. Id. ¶ 210.
203. Id. ¶ 231.
204. Id. ¶ 232.
205. Id. ¶¶ 238-39.
206. Id. ¶ 243.
207. Cf. id. ¶ 269 (“This provisional conclusion [the application of the China-Laos BIT
to Macao] has to be verified and confirmed by the analysis of the application to the situation
of Article 29 of the VCLT which has broader exceptions than the ones included in Article 15
of the VCST”).
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application of the China-Laos BIT to Macao but to determine so, it first
discerned the legal nature of the Basic Law and the China-Portugal Joint
Declaration, finding:
[T]he Basic Law of the Macao SAR in and of itself, as an internal
law, cannot be considered as legally capable of modifying the in-
ternational rule set out in Article 15. It is well known that “the
binding character of treaties is determined by international law,
which on this point takes precedence over internal law.
The Tribunal, however, considers that the same is not true of the
Joint Declaration, which can be considered an international treaty
and, more precisely, a devolution treaty, by which the two States
involved in a process of succession decide the modalities of such
succession.208
Nevertheless, the tribunal questioned the binding effect of the China-Por-
tugal Joint Declaration on third parties, in this case Laos.209 Initially, it
focused on the text of the Joint Declaration that also is reproduced in the
Macao Basic Law and analyzed the diverging interpretations of the par-
ties.210 The relevant passage provides that “[t]he application to [Macao] of
international agreements [. . .] shall be decided by the Central People’s
Government [. . .] after seeking the views of the government of the
Region.”211
For its part, Sanum claimed that this wording supported the applica-
tion of the China-Laos BIT to Macao, given that China had not made
explicit representations to the contrary.212 To put it differently, Sanum al-
leged that the China-Laos BIT “is to be presumed applicable” to Macao
“until the PRC Government decides, after consulting [Macao] that it does
not apply.”213 However, the tribunal did not agree with this approach. On
the contrary, it found that an interpretation in conformity with Article 31
of the VCLT reveals that the above provision “is to the effect that the
treaties will be applied when the PRC Government so decides and not that
they will be applied unless the PRC Government so decides.”214
Regardless, the tribunal went on to examine the legal nature of the
Joint Declaration and particularly its effect on third parties. In this regard,
the tribunal noted that the Joint Declaration could be regarded as a devo-
lution treaty, by which China and Portugal decided the modalities of
China’s succession to Macao.215 However, according to the tribunal, devo-
208. Id. ¶¶ 257-8 (internal footnote omitted).
209. Id. ¶¶ 265-6.
210. Id. ¶ 259.
211. China-Portugal Joint Declaration, supra note 168, Annex 1, art. I; Macao Basic
Law, supra note 169, art. 138.
212. Sanum v. Laos, ¶¶ 261-2.
213. Id. ¶ 262.
214. Id. ¶ 263.
215. Id. ¶¶ 258-9, 264.
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lution treaties “can only bind third parties if they apply the customary
principles of international law,” which “simply means that if devolution
treaties adopt different solutions to those foreseen by the rules of State
succession, those solutions do not bind third States.”216 In line with this
argument, the tribunal stretched the otherwise relative effect of treaties,217
suggesting:
Laos, having not been informed that its treaty with the PRC [the
China-Laos BIT] would only be extended after a procedure of
consultation -which in fact never seems to have been enforced-,
cannot claim that such an agreement between the PRC and Laos
could set aside the international rule applicable to a bilateral
treaty between itself and the PRC.218
Thus, the tribunal found that pursuant to Article 15 of the VCST—and
otherwise under Article 29 of the VCLT—the China-Laos BIT should be
“deemed to have been extended” to Macao.219 The crucial therefore point
in the tribunal’s analysis was the effect of the China-Portugal Joint Decla-
ration on third parties such as Laos. The nature of the Joint Declaration
and its effect on third parties is discussed again in Part V but it suffices to
say that the SGHC has overlooked this matter.
Finally, the tribunal examined China’s BITs as well as the two BITs
concluded by Macao without however finding evidence supporting the
non-application to Macao of the China-Laos BIT.220 Furthermore, this tri-
bunal, similar to that in Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, did not regard parallelism
as evidence dictating the non-application of the latter treaty to Macao. In
relevant part, the decision of the tribunal reads as follows:
290. The Tribunal does not accept this conclusion. It can indeed
also mean, with as much if not more logic, that the PRC-BIT ap-
plies to the whole territory including the Macao SAR, while the
Macao SAR-BIT is confined to the territory of Macao but cannot
extend to Mainland China.
291. Another argument put forward by the Respondent is that the
overlapping of the PRC and Macao BITs with the same third
State would bring about “legal chaos for foreign investors.”
292. In the Tribunal’s view, the superposition of instruments of
protection does not bring about chaos, but rather better protec-
tion to foreign investors. The Tribunal agrees with the Claimant
216. Id. ¶ 265 (citing Brigitte Stern, La succession d’Etats, 262 REC. DES COURS 9
(1996), at 169).
217. See VCLT, supra note 22, art. 57.
218. Sanum v. Laos, ¶¶ 268. In light of the tribunal’s analysis, the reference to “an
agreement between the PRC and Laos” should instead be read as “between the PRC and
Portugal.”
219. Id. ¶ 269.
220. Id. ¶¶ 270-300.
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when it states that “[t]he fact that the PRC authorized Macau to
enter into the bilateral investment treaties at issue does not other-
wise establish an intention that its own BITs should not extend to
the territory of Macau; it is equally consistent with a supplemental
regime of protection for Macanese investors, above and beyond
that provided by the PRC treaties . . . ”
294. The Tribunal does not consider that the concomitant applica-
tion of these two BITs would lead to “legal chaos”. The more dis-
pute settlement options an investor has, the better it is protected,
and the more enhanced the economic cooperation will be between
the concerned States.
295. In the Tribunal’s view, the existence of two treaties facilitates
rather than hinders the fulfillment of the goals of the BITs, which
are the protection of the foreign investors and the economic de-
velopment of the host State.221
Considering the above analysis, the next Section examines the contradic-
tory ruling of the SGHC in the subsequent set-aside proceedings.
C. Laos v. Sanum: Set Aside Proceedings Before the
Singapore High Court (SGHC)
At the outset, two remarks are of particular relevance to this case.
First, prior to the judgment of the SGHC, the Sanum case had been settled
along with a parallel claim under the Laos-Netherlands BIT filed by Lao
Holdings, the one hundred percent shareholder of Sanum.222 Shortly after
the settlement, Lao Holdings pursued claims over the alleged breach of
the settlement agreement.223 Eventually, however, an ICSID tribunal
found that Laos had not breached the settlement agreement thus rejecting
the claims of Lao Holdings.224 This meant that the Sanum case remained
the only avenue for the investor’s ability to directly sue the Government of
Laos. For this reason, soon after the decision of the SGHC, Sanum filed a
petition for leave to appeal.225 This development reveals the topical char-
acter of the issues discussed in this article. On the same time, it is interest-
221. Id. ¶¶ 290-92 and 294-95 (internal footnotes omitted).
222. See Lao Holdings N.V. v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/12/6, Settlement Agreement (June 15, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italaw3235_0.pdf; Sanum Investments Ltd. v. Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, PCA Case No. 2013-13, Settlement Agreement (June 15, 2014), http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3235.pdf.
223. See Lao Holdings N.V. v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/12/6, Interim Ruling on Issues Arising Under the Deed of Settlement (Dec. 19,
2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4103.pdf.
224. See Lao Holdings N.V. v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/12/6, Decision on the Merits (June 10, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italaw4333.pdf; see also Sebastian Perry, Casino Investor Fails to Revive
Laos Claim, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REVIEW, June 16, 2015.
225. The hearing on Sanum’s petition for leave to appeal took place on July 13, 2015.
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ing to see whether leave to appeal will be granted and in this case whether
the Court of Appeal will eventually reverse the decision of the SGHC.
Second, in reviewing the case, the SGHC, unlike the UNCITRAL tri-
bunal, was equipped with an Exchange of Letters between the Laotian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Embassy in Vientiane.226
More specifically, the Laotian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to
China’s Embassy in Vientiane on January 7, 2014, seeking the view of “the
Government of the People’s Republic of China regarding the status of the
[China-Lao BIT] in relation to [Macau].” In this letter the Laotian Minis-
try took the view that
the Agreement does not extend to [Macau] for the reasons based
on the People’s Republic of China’s policy of one country, two
systems, its constitutional and legal framework, the Basic Law of
[Macau] as well as the fact that the Agreement itself is silent on its
extension to [Macau], which returned to the sovereignty of the
People’s Republic of China in 1999, six years after the signing of
the Agreement.227
In a reply dated January 9, 2014, China’s Embassy in Vientiane stated:
In accordance with the <<Basic Law of [Macau]>>, the Govern-
ment of [Macau] may, with the authorization of the Central Peo-
ple’s Government conclude and implement investment
agreements on its own with foreign states and regions; in principle
the bilateral investment agreements concluded by the Central
People’s Government are not applicable to [Macau], unless the
opinion of the Special Administrative Region Government has
been sought, and separate arrangements have been made after
consultation with the contracting party. In view of the foregoing,
[the PRC-Laos BIT] concluded in Vientiane on 31 January 1993 is
not applicable to [Macau] unless both China and Laos make sepa-
rate arrangements in the future.228
This Exchange of Letters expressly provides for the non-application of the
China-Laos BIT to Macao and as already noted took place well after the
rendering of the decision on jurisdiction of the UNCITRAL tribunal.229
The case, however, still remains open for the temporal effects of such an
Exchange of Letters.
226. Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Sanum Investments Ltd.,




227. Id. ¶ 39.
228. Id. ¶ 40.
229. Id. ¶¶ 39, 57-58, 67-88.
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The SGHC, in deciding the application of the China-Laos BIT to Ma-
cao, proceeded in first analyzing the matter through the prism of Articles
29 of the VCLT and 15 of the VCST.230 In this regard, the SGHC noted
that while both China and Laos are parties to the VCLT but not to the
VCST, Laos and Sanum have both agreed that these provisions enshrine
rules of customary international law.231 In conformity with these provi-
sions, the SGHC opined that the China-Laos BIT should be deemed appli-
cable to Macao unless the contrary appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established.232 This reading does not stretch out the textual differences
between Articles 29 and 15 of the VCST.233 Indeed, the latter Article pro-
vides for a departure from the default rule of continuity if it appears from
the treaty or is otherwise established that this would be incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the condi-
tions for the treaty’s operation.234 In any case, the SGHC went on to ex-
amine whether it appeared from the treaty or could otherwise be
established that the China-Laos BIT did not apply to Macao. In this re-
gard, the SGHC first found that the China-Laos BIT did not provide gui-
dance with respect to the matter under examination and, similar to the
UNCITRAL tribunal, did not discuss the use of the plural “laws” instead
of “law” employed by this treaty.235 For this reason, it went on to examine
whether it could otherwise be established that this BIT did not apply to
Macao. To do so, it examined the Exchange of Letters referred to above,
other BITs concluded by China, but not the FTAs and multilateral invest-
ment treaties examined in Part I, the China-Portugal Joint Declaration,
the 1999 Note to the UNSG, and the WTO Trade Policy Report. It also
drew an analogy with the case of Hong Kong.236
Setting out from the Exchange of Letters, the SGHC focused on Arti-
cle 31 of the VCLT, which in relevant part refers to “[a]ny subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty
or the application of its provisions.”237 For its part, Sanum argued that the
critical date of admitting such evidence was August 14, 2012, whereupon
the proceedings before the UNCITRAL tribunal had commenced, as well
as that China’s intent that was of relevance was that which existed at the
moment of the handover, and not its present day intent.238 The SGHC
disagreed with this approach finding that the Exchange of Letters consti-
tutes a subsequent agreement under Article 31 of the VCLT for the non-
230. Id. ¶¶ 57-59.
231. Id. ¶ 60.
232. Id. ¶¶ 61-62.
233. Id.
234. VCST, supra note 23, art. 15.
235. Lao v. Sanum, ¶ 63; see also supra Section 2.1.
236. See Lao v. Sanum, ¶ 65.
237. VCLT, supra note 22, art. 31(3)(a); see also Lao v. Sanum, ¶ 69-70.
238. Lao v. Sanum, ¶ 68.
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application of the China-Laos BIT to Macao.239 To corroborate its find-
ings, the SGHC also referred to another case of the High Court, where a
letter from the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs was regarded as
embodying an agreement for the non-application to Hong Kong of the
China-Singapore bilateral judicial assistance treaty (JAT).240 However, the
SGHC failed to clarify whether the Exchange of Letters was a subsequent
interpretation or modification. This point becomes relevant when consid-
ering the approach of the SGHC with regard to the temporal effect of the
above Exchange of Letters. In more detail, the SGHC noted:
If Art 31(3)(a) is of general application to most treaties, then par-
ties relying on the provisions of BITs would be forewarned that
subsequent agreements could potentially affect the interpretation
of the treaty provisions. In any case, the PRC government would
have been fully aware of the implications of their opinion as
stated in the PRC Letter especially since it was worded in general
terms. This categorical approach suggests to me that the position
adopted in the letter was a confirmation of the status quo rather
than a dramatic upheaval of the current expectations held by
states which have treaties with PRC.241
While this would suggest that the SGHC leaned toward identifying the
Exchange of Letters as a subsequent interpretation, the SGHC neverthe-
less noted that the exchange “did not amount to a retroactive agreement
that altered the positions and expectations of third parties such as the de-
fendant” since:
[f]rom the way that the PRC Letter was worded, it appears that
the non-applicability of the PRC-Laos BIT to Macau was not a
dramatic change of position but was rather an affirmation of the
common understanding between the states that the treaty from its
inception did not apply to Macau.242
This article finds that the analysis of the SGHC is not adequate in this
regard. However, with regard to all the other elements that the SGHC
examined, it is first noted that other BITs concluded by China were found
of “limited utility”243 and the parallelism existent between Chinese BITs
and those BITs concluded by Macao was found incapable of drawing “any
239. Id. ¶¶ 69-70, 74-78.
240. Id. ¶¶ 71-72 (citing Lee Hsien Loong v. Review Publishing Co. Ltd. and Another
and Another Suit, 2 SLR 453, Judgment (Feb. 21, 2007)). In fact, in the Lee Hsien Loong v.
Review Publishing decision the SHC relied on a letter from the Singaporean Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, stating that the Hong Kong Department of Justice had confirmed that the
China-Singapore JAT was not applicable to Hong Kong. This is different than the Exchange
of Letters referenced in Lao v. Sanum.
241. Lao v. Sanum, ¶ 76.
242. Id. ¶ 77.
243. Id. ¶ 88. See also id. ¶¶ 79-87.
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definite conclusions.”244 In addition, the SGHC adopted the view that Ma-
cao’s capacity to enter into its own BITs “does not automatically lead to
the conclusion that [China’s] BITs do not apply to Macau,” but “tends to
suggest to a limited extent that [China’s] treaties do not apply to Ma-
cau.”245 As later discussed, this article finds that the burgeoning parallel-
ism of China’s IIAs does not necessarily support the conclusions of the
SGHC.
Second, the 1987 China-Portugal Joint Declaration was found to sup-
port the non-application of the China-Laos BIT to Macao.246 In particular,
Laos pointed to the Declaration in order to show that for China’s interna-
tional treaties to apply to Macao, a relevant territorial extension ought to
have taken place.247 On the contrary, Sanum claimed that the Declaration
was a treaty between China and Portugal that was only binding between
them, did not “create rights or duties for other states such as Laos,” and
was concerned with China’s “internal constitutional arrangements with
Macau.”248 However, the SGHC did not accept such arguments.249 Never-
theless, it is striking that the SGHC did not enter into a discussion of the
legal nature of the Joint Declaration and its effect of third parties, such as
Laos.
Third, the 1999 Note to the UNSG was found to provide no guidance
to the present issue. This was because, as earlier explained, it referred to
multilateral treaties alone.250
Fourth, the analogy drawn with Hong Kong was found very similar to
that of Macao, and while both the Joint Declaration for Macao and that
for Hong Kong were not regarded “conclusive,”251 the SGHC noted that
they nevertheless showed that China “was likely to have been of the view
that” its treaties “would not automatically apply to Macau” and Hong
Kong after the respective handover.252
Finally, excerpts from the WTO Trade Policy Report, and especially
from the 2001 issue that referred to Macao’s BIT with Portugal indicating
that Macao at that stage had “no other” BITs,253 were found of having
“some bearing on the issue” but were nevertheless inconclusive.254 There-
fore, in weighing these findings along with the Exchange of Letters, the
SGHC opined that the China-Laos BIT did not apply to Macao.
244. Id. ¶ 86.
245. Id. ¶ 87.
246. Id. ¶¶ 90-93.
247. Id. ¶ 90.
248. Id. ¶ 91.
249. Id. ¶¶ 92-93.
250. Id. ¶¶ 94-98.
251. Id. ¶ 105; see also ¶¶ 99-104.
252. Id. ¶ 106.
253. Id. ¶ 107.
254. Id. ¶¶ 108-09.
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In brief, the above summary clearly indicates that the SGHC’s reason-
ing diverges from that of the UNCITRAL tribunal. However, it should not
be forgotten that unlike the UNCITRAL tribunal, the SGHC was also in
possession of the Exchange of Letters and the WTO Trade Policy Report
of 2001. Nevertheless, the SGHC was of the view that its predecessor (the
UNCITRAL tribunal) also had sufficient evidence to rebut the general
assumption on the application to Macao of the China-Laos BIT.255 How-
ever, what is remarkable is that the analysis that preceded in Parts I to III
and in the summaries of the cases above makes it abundantly clear that the
application of China’s IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao is unsettled, even
after the ruling of the SGHC. The reasoning of both the UNCITRAL tri-
bunal and the SGHC is inescapably trapped in the pervasive uncertainty
over the territorial application of China’s IIAs. And while the Exchange
of Letters between the Laotian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China’s
Embassy in Laos is significant, it still remains unclear whether it can be
regarded as a position of general application for both Hong Kong and
Macao.
Seeking to further clarify the issue as well as to refine the findings of
the SGHC, the next Part examines relevant treaty and arbitral practice on
the territorial application and extension of IIAs, draws an analogy with
cases of state dissolution and secession and revisits the temporal effects of
the Exchange of Letters, the legal nature of the Joint Declarations, and the
bearing of the pervasive parallelism in China’s investment
“treatification.”256
V. THE SANUM CASE IN NEW LIGHT
The aim of this part is to further the discussion of the application of
China’s IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao. Thus, the first Section examines
the practice of the U.K., as well as other countries, such as Denmark and
the U.S., with regard to the territorial extension of their IIAs. Then, Sec-
tion B focuses on succession in part of territory through the prism of an
analogy with cases of state dissolution and secession, and particularly in
connection to the BITs concluded by Czechoslovakia, the FRY, and the
USSR. Section C revisits the temporal effects of subsequent interpreta-
tions and underscores the weaknesses of the SGHC’s reasoning with re-
gard to the Exchange of Letters. Section D focuses on the legal nature of
the Joint Declarations and criticizes the SGHC for not dealing with the
matter. Finally, Section E assesses the impact of parallelism to the territo-
rial application of China’s IIAs.
255. Id. ¶ 111.
256. See SALACUSE, supra note 6, at 78 (introducing the term “treatification”).
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A. State Practice on the Territorial Extension of IIAs
1. Bilateral Treaties
As it is well known, certain states, such as Denmark and the Nether-
lands, are comprised of both metropolitan areas and overseas territories.
For the U.K., the case is more complex, with territory comprising its met-
ropolitan area (Great Britain and Northern Ireland), the Crown depen-
dencies (Isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey) and the overseas territories
(such as Gibraltar, Bermuda, and the Turks and Caicos Islands). Recall
that, prior to the 1997 “handover,” Hong Kong was also one of U.K.’s
overseas territories. In light of the above, the territorial application of
BITs becomes crucial, especially when considering that the majority of
overseas territories (along with the Crown dependencies for the U.K.)
form separate jurisdictions and have promulgated their own company
laws, while also retaining separate commercial registries.257 Although rele-
vant state practice is not always uniform, it nevertheless militates in favor
of a presumption of territorial extension, especially when a state does not
wish to equip its BITs with application in the entirety of its territory.
In particular, the U.K., Denmark, and the Netherlands appear to be
the most consistent in terms of the territorial application of their BITs.
The UK consistently defines its territory as comprising Great Britain and
Northern Ireland (the United Kingdom),258 but additionally includes a
provision that allows for the territorial extension of its BITs through sub-
sequent Exchange of Notes.259 Pursuant to the latter provision, the territo-
257. See generally SINCLAIR, supra note 120, at 90-92.
258. See e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, El Sal.-
U.K., art. 1(d), Oct. 14, 1999, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/
1138; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Leb.-U.K., art. 1(4), Feb.
16, 1999, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1904; Agreement for
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Bulg.-U.K., art. 1(d), Dec. 11, 1995,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/555 [hereinafter Bulgaria-U.K.
BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Burundi-U.K., art. 1(e),
Sept. 13, 1990, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3223; Agreement
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-U.S.S.R., art. 1(e), Apr. 6, 1989, http:/
/investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2235; Agreement for the Promotion
and Protection of Investments, Benin-U.K., art. 1(e), Nov. 27, 1987, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3221; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection
of Investments, Belize-U.K., art. 1(e), Apr. 30, 1982, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/436; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Phil.-U.K., art. 1(2)(b), Dec. 3, 1980, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/2178; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sri Lanka-
U.K., art. 1(e), Feb. 13, 1980, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/
2293; Agreement for the Promotion of the Investment of Capital and for the Protection of
Investments, Thai.-U.K., art. 2(5), Nov. 23, 1978, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/2344; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Egypt-U.K., art. 1(e), June 11, 1975, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/1122. For British investment treaties, see generally Francis A. Mann, British Trea-
ties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 The BRIT. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 241
(1981).
259. See, e.g., Bulgaria-U.K. BIT, supra note 258, art. 12; Egypt-U.K. BIT, supra note
258, art. 11; see also Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Fall 2015] Applying China’s Investment Treaties 169
rial scope of UK BITs has been extended from time to time to various
overseas territories and the Crown dependencies.260 Prior to the
“handover,” the U.K. also had extended the application of some BITs to
Hong Kong.261 Given the consistency of the U.K. in territorially extending
its BITs, notice that the China-U.K. BIT only includes a territorial exten-
sion provision for the part of the U.K. This arguably creates a strong pre-
sumption that China was aware of this practice, and had it wanted to
territorially extend the treaty to Hong Kong and Macao at a later stage, it
would have stated so explicitly. In fact, the China-U.K. BIT not only was
concluded in 1986—two years after the U.K.-China Joint Declaration of
1984—but also covers “corporations, firms or associations incorporated or
constituted under the law in force in any part of the People’s Republic of
Colom.-U.K., art. I(4), XIV, Mar. 17, 2010, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/3253; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Gam.-U.K.,
art. 1(e), July 2, 2002, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1316;
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Morocco-U.K., art. 1(d), Oct.
30, 1990, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2051. One exception to
the U.K’s widespread use of the territorial extension provision is Malaysia. See Agreement
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Malay.-U.K., May 21, 1981, http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1972; see also Chester Brown & Audley
Sheppard, United Kingdom, in COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREA-
TIES 697, 718 (Chester Brown ed., 2013).
260. See, e.g., Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 72 (1993) (Cm. 2365) at 8 (Exchange of Notes entered
into force on Sept. 22, 1992 extending the Guy.-U.K. BIT to the Isle of Man, Gibraltar, the
Turks and Caicos Islands, Bermuda and the Bailiwicks of Guernsey and Jersey); Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 16 (2002) (Cm. 5489) (Exchange of Notes entered into force on Nov. 12, 1999 extending
the U.K.-Uzb. BIT to the Isle of Man and the Bailiwicks of Guernsey and Jersey); Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 37 (2000) (Cm. 4665) (Exchange of Notes entered into force on Oct. 11, 1999 ex-
tending Pak.-U.K. BIT to the Isle of Man and the Bailiwick of Guernsey and Jersey); Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 72 (1993) (Cm. 2365) at 7 (Exchange of Notes entered into force on July 20,
1992 extending the Gren.-U.K. BIT to the Isle of Man, Gibraltar, the Turks and Caicos Is-
lands, Bermuda and the Bailiwicks of Guernsey and Jersey); Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 109 (1996)
(Cm. 3650) at 26 (Exchange of Notes extending the Mauritius-U.K. BIT to Gibraltar, Isle of
Man, and the Bailiwicks of Guernsey and Jersey); Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 30 (1986) (Cd. 9787)
(Exchange of Notes entered into force on Dec. 10, 1985 extending the Belize-U.K. BIT to the
Turks and Caicos Islands); Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32 (1986) (Cd. 9812) (Exchange of Notes en-
tered into force on Feb. 4, 1986 extending the Belize-U.K. BIT to the Cayman Islands); Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 54 (1999) (Cm. 4438) (Exchange of Notes entered into force on Mar. 22, 1999
extending the Rom.-U.K. BIT to the Isle of Man and the Bailiwicks of Guernsey and Jersey).
For relevant case law, see, e.g., British Caribbean Bank Ltd. v. Belize, UNCITRAL, PCA
Case No. 2010-18, Award, ¶ 3 (Dec. 19, 2014); S. Am. Silver Ltd. v. Bol., UNCITRAL, PCA
Case No. 2013-15, Claimant’s Notice of Arbitration, §§ 62-64 (Apr. 30, 2013); EDF (Serv.)
Ltd. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶¶ 1, 64 (Oct. 8, 2009).
261. See, e.g., Exchange of Notes extending the Jordan-U.K. BIT to Hong Kong (May
14, 1986); Exchange of Notes extending the Belize-U.K. BIT to Hong Kong, the Bailiwicks of
Jersey and Guernsey and the Isle of Man (Mar. 14, 1983); Exchange of Notes extending the
Korea-U.K. BIT to Hong Kong (Mar. 4, 1976). Such extensions should now be regarded
ineffective. This is abundantly clear when taking into account the China-U.K. Joint Declara-
tion as well as the Hong Kong-U.K. BIT (1998).
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China.”262 On the other hand, the conclusion of the U.K.-Hong Kong BIT
in 1998 could suggest that in U.K.’s view, the U.K.-China BIT did not
apply to Hong Kong. But first, this is not conclusive for China, and second,
it remains to be examined whether these treaties would apply in parallel.
In the same vein, Denmark consistently excludes Greenland and the
Faroe Islands from the application of its IIAs,263 although it provides for
the extension to these territories through an Exchange of Notes.264 This
practice is similar to that of the U.K., with the exception that an extension
provision is not always inserted in Danish BITs.265 However, this does not
mean that the contracting parties cannot agree to a relevant territorial ex-
tension absent such provision. It merely indicates that Danish treaty prac-
tice is not as coherent as that of the UK. Likewise, the China-Denmark
BIT of 1985 does not contain a territorial extension provision, but never-
theless excludes Greenland and the Faroe islands from its application.266
262. Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
China-U.K., art. 1(1)(d), May 15, 1986, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/793 (emphasis added).
263. See e.g., Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of In-
vestments, Alg.-Den., art. 1(4), Jan. 25, 1999, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Down
load/TreatyFile/43 [hereinafter Algeria-Denmark BIT]; Agreement Concerning the Promo-
tion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Arg.-Den., art. 1(6), Nov. 6, 1992, http://in-
vestmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/84 [hereinafter Argentina-Denmark
BIT].
264. See e.g., Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Bos. &
Herz.-Den., art. 13, Mar. 24, 2004, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/Treaty
File/468; Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Croat.-Den., art. 13, July 5, 2000, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/854; Algeria-Denmark BIT, supra note 263, art. 14; Agreement on the Promotion
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Den.-Russ., art. 11(2), Nov. 4, 1993, http://invest
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1028; Agreement Concerning the Promotion
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Bulg.-Den., art. 14, Apr. 14, 1993, http://invest
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/524; Argentina-Denmark BIT, supra note
263, art. 14.
265. See Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Den.-Kuwait, art. 1(8), June 1, 2001, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/1012; Agreement for the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments, Den.-
Malay., art. 1(5), Jan. 6, 1992, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/
1017; Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Den.-Turk., art. 1(4), Feb. 7, 1990, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/1032; Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and the Reciprocal Protection
of Investments, Den.-S. Kor., art. 1(5), June 2, 1988, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/1011; Agreement for the Encouragement and the Reciprocal Protec-
tion of Investments, Den.-Hung., art. 1(4), May 2, 1988, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1008; Agreement Concerning the Encouragement
and the Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Den.-Sri Lanka, art. 1(5-6), June 4, 1985, http:/
/investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1030; China-Denmark BIT, supra
note 31, art. 1(5), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/727; Agree-
ment on the Mutual Promotion and Guarantee of Investments, Den.-Rom., arts. 3, 9(3), Nov.
12, 1980, 1257 U.N.T.S. 138; Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and the Reciprocal
Protection of Investments (with Protocol), Den.-Indon., arts. II, IX, Jan. 30, 1968 720
U.N.T.S. 223.
266. See China-Denmark BIT, supra note 31, art. 1(5).
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However, no reference is made to Hong Kong and Macao, although,
again, the presumption is that China was aware of Denmark’s territorial
extension practice.
Similar to the U.K. and Denmark, the Netherlands consistently in-
cludes a territorial application provision that in principle either extends or
carves out the non-European part of the Kingdom, i.e. the ex-Netherlands
Antilles.267 Again, the presumption is against China since it had also con-
cluded a BIT with the Netherlands.268 Furthermore, the US had only re-
cently started to explicitly define the territorial scope of its BITs, although
the issue remains important for such territories as American Samoa,
Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico,
and the United States Virgin Islands.269 According to a new provision,
also found in U.S. FTAs that contain investment promotion and protection
provisions, such overseas territories should generally be regarded as falling
within the territorial ambit of U.S. IIAs.270
267. See, e.g., Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Arm.-Neth., art. 13, June 10, 2005, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/140; China-Netherlands BIT, supra note 17, art. 14; Agreement on Reciprocal En-
couragement and Protection of Investments, Neth.-Turk., art. 11, March 27, 1986, http://in
vestmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2090 (extending its application only to
Aruba); Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Neth.-
Yemen, art. 12, Mar. 18, 1985, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/
2097 (extending its application only to the part of the Kingdom in Europe). Prior to the
independence of Surinam, relevant extensions to this territory also had been made. See
Agreement on Economic Co-operation, Malay.-Neth., art. 16, June 15, 1971, http://investment
policyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1959 (extending its application to Surinam and
the Netherlands Antilles).
268. See China-Netherlands BIT, supra note 17, art. 14.
269. See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, U.S. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
169-72 (2009); see, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, Croat.-U.S., art. 1(1), July 13, 1996, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/897; Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection
of Investment, Arg.-U.S., art. 1(f), Nov. 14, 1991), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/127.
‘[T]erritory’ means the territory of the United States or the Argentine Republic,
including the territorial sea established in accordance with international law as re-
flected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This Treaty
also applies in the seas and seabed adjacent to the territorial sea in which the
United States or the Argentine Republic has sovereign rights or jurisdiction in
accordance with international law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea.
Id. See also Lee M. Caplan & Jeremy K. Sharpe, United States, in COMMENTARIES ON SE-
LECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES 755, 771-72 (Chester Brown ed., 2013).
270. See Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ment, U.S.-Uru., art. 1, Nov. 4, 2005, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/2380 (defining territory as “(i) the customs territory of the United States, which
includes the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico; (ii) the foreign trade zones
located in the United States and Puerto Rico; and (iii) any areas beyond the territorial seas of
the United States within which, in accordance with international law and its domestic law, the
United States may exercise rights with respect to the seabed and subsoil and their natural
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On the contrary, Spanish and French BITs do not include any refer-
ence whatsoever to their territorial application to overseas territories.
While the case could be less ambiguous with respect to the Canary Islands
that constitute an autonomous community of Spain or the French overseas
departments such as Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique, the same
might not be true for the French overseas collectivities of New Caledonia
and French Polynesia. Lastly, Portugal’s BITs generally remain silent with
regard to their application to Madeira and the Azores,271 except for one of
resources”); see also Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, Rwanda-U.S., art. 1, Feb. 19, 2008, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/2241; S. Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, art. 1.4, June 30, 2007,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text; Colom.-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement, Annex 1.3, Nov. 22, 2006, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text; Peru-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Annex 1.3, Apr.
12, 2006, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text; Central
America-Dom. Rep.-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Annex 2.1, Aug. 5, 2004, https://ustr.gov/
trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/fi-
nal-text; Morocco-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, art. 1.3, June 15, 2004, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta/final-text; Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agree-
ment, Annex 1-A, May 18, 2004, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
australian-fta/final-text; Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Annex 2.1, June 6, 2003, https://
ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text; Singapore-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement, Annex 1A(2), May 6, 2003, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/singapore-fta/final-text.
271. See, e.g., Accord Entre la Republique Du Congo Et La Republique Portugaise
Relatif a la Promotion et la Protection Reciproques des Investissements, Congo-Port., art.
3(e) June 4, 2010, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/815; Acordo
Entre a Republica Portuguesa e o Governo da Republica Democratica e Popular da Argelia
Sobre a Pormocao e a Proteccao Reciproca de Investimentos, Alg.-Port., art. 1(4), Sept. 15,
2004, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/56; Acordo Entre a
Republica Portuguesa e a Grande Jamahiriya Arabe Libia Popular SocialistaSobre a Promo-
cao e a Proteccao Reciprocas de Investimentos, Libya-Port., art. 1(3), June 14, 2003, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1912; Agreement on the Promotion
and Protection of Investments, Phil.-Port., art. 1, Nov. 8, 2002, http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2170; Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Protection
of Investments, Bosn. & Herz.-Port., art. 1(4), Mar. 13, 2002, http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/485; Accord Entre la Republique Portugaise et la Repub-
lique Gabonaise Relatif a la Promotion et la Protection Reciproques des Investissements,
Gabon-Port., art. 1(4), Dec. 17, 2001, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/1304; Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments, India-
Port., art. 1(4), June 28, 2000, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/
1588; Acuerdo Entre la Republica Portuguesa y la Republica del Paraguay Sobre Promocion
y Proteccion Reci Proca de Inversiones, Para.-Port., art. 1(4), Nov. 24, 1999, http://investment
policyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2149; Agreement on the Reciprocol Promotion
and Protection of Investments, Mex.-Port., art. 1(4), Nov. 11, 1999, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2000; Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investments, Egypt-Port., art. 1(4), Apr. 28, 1999, http://investmentpolicy
hub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1102; Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Protec-
tion of Investments, Alb.-Port., art. 1(4), Sept. 11, 1998, http://investmentpolicy
hub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/27; Acuerdo Entre la Republica Portuguesa y la
Republica de Cuba Sobre la Promocion y Proteccion Reciprocas de Inversiones, Cuba-Port.,
art. 1(4), July 8, 1998, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/912;
Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments, Lith.-Port., art. 1(4),
May 27, 1998, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1919; Acordo En-
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its BITs, which explicitly refers to Madeira and the Azores.272 This could
potentially create concerns, similar to those expressed with regard to the
tre a Republica Portuguesa e a Repbulica de Angola Sobre a Promocao e a Proteccao
Reciproca de Investimentos, Angl.-Port., art. 1(4), Oct. 24, 1997, http://investmentpolicy
hub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2974; Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Protec-
tion of Investments, Pak.-Port., art. 1(4), Oct. 11, 1996, http://investmentpolicy
hub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2124; Acordo Entre a Republica Portuguesa e a
Republica de Mocambique Sobre a Promocao e a Proteccao Reciproca de Investimentos,
Mozam.-Port., art. 1(4), May 28, 1996, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/2056; Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments, Lat.-
Port., art. 1, Sept. 27, 1995, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1875;
Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Croat.-Port., art.
1(4), May 9, 1995, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/882; Agree-
ment on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments, S. Kor.-Port., art. 1(4), May 3,
1995, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1823; Acuerdo Entre la
Republica de Chile y la Republica Portuguesa Sobre la Promocion y Proteccion Reciproca de
Inversiones, Chile-Port., art. 1(3), Apr. 28, 1995, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/703; Acuerdo Entre la Republica del Peru y la Republica Portuguesa
Sobre Promocion y Proteccion Reciproca de Inversiones, Peru-Port., art. 1(5), Nov. 22, 1994;
Acordo Entre a Republica Portuguesa e a Republica Argentina Sobre a Promocao e a Pro-
teccao Reciproca de Investimentos, Arg.-Port., art. 1(5), Oct. 6, 1994; Acordo Entre o
Governo da Republica Portugues e o Governo da Federacao da Russia Sobre a Promocao e
Proteccao Reciproca de Investimentos, Port.-Russ., art. 1, Nov. 21, 1994; Acordo Entre a
Republica Portuguesa e a Republica Argentina Sobre a Promocao e a Proteccao Reciproca
de Investimentos, Arg.-Port., art. 1(5), Oct. 6, 1994, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/114; Acordo Para a Promocao e a Proteccao Reciproca de Investi-
mentos Entre o Governo da Republica Portuguesa e o Governo da Republica Federativa do
Brasil, Braz.-Port., art. 1(V), Feb. 9, 1994, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/511; Agreement for the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments, Port.-
Rom., art. 1, Nov. 17, 1993, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/
2192; Agreement for the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments, Bulg.-Port., art.
1(5), May 27, 1993, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/544; Acordo
Entre o Governo da Republica Portuguesa e o Governo da Republica da Polonia Sobre a
Promocao e Proteccao Mutuas de Investimentos, Pol.-Port., art. 1, May 11, 1993, http://invest
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2181; Acordo Sobre Promocao e Proteccao
de Investimentos Entre a Republica Portuguesa e a Republica da Guine-Bissau, Guinea-
Bissau-Port., art. 2(6), June 24, 1991, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/1502; Acordo Sobre Promocao e Proteccao de Investimentos Entre a Republica
Portuguesa e a Republica de Cabo Verde, Cape Verde-Port., art. 2(6), Oct. 26, 1990, http://in
vestmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/648; Accord Entre la Republique Portu-
gaise et le Royaume du Maroc Concernant la Promotion et la Protection Reciproques des
Investissements, Morocco-Port., art. 1, Oct. 18, 1998, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/2984; Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Por-
tugiesischen Republik uber die Forderung und den gegenseitigen Schutz von Kapitalanlagen,
Ger.-Port., art. 1(4), Sept. 16, 1980, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/1394.
272. Agreement for the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments, Mauritius-
Port., art. 1(4), Dec. 12, 1997, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/
1988.
The term ‘territory’ means: (a) for the Portuguese Republic, the territory of the
Portuguese Republic situated in the European Continent, the archipelagoes of
Azores and Madeira, the respective [sic] territorial sea and any other zone in
which, in accordance with the laws of Portugal and international law, the Portu-
guese Republic has its jurisdiction or sovereign rights with respect to the explora-
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China-Russia BIT, since only one IIA expressly carves out Hong Kong
and Macao from its application. However, the China-Portugal BIT of
1992, concluded well after the China-Portugal Joint Declaration of 1987,
did not contain any reference to Macao (or Hong Kong) and, additionally,
did not include a definition of “territory.”273 The Portugal-China BIT of
2005 that replaced the latter treaty also does not make any reference to
Hong Kong and Macao, but nevertheless includes a definition of “terri-
tory.”274 Finally, the Portugal-Macao BIT of 2000 is neither supportive nor
exclusive of the non-application of the Portugal-China BIT to Macao.275
2. Multilateral Treaties
Similar state practice is also encountered in the context of multilateral
investment treaties. Given that the case of the ICSID Convention has al-
ready been discussed, this sub-section examines the ECT that is a sectoral
multilateral investment treaty that contains both substantive and procedu-
ral provisions.276 This treaty includes a definition on territory277 but also a
provision on territorial application providing that any state:
may at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, by a declaration deposited with the Depository, declare
that the Treaty shall be binding upon it with respect to all the terri-
tories for the international relations of which it is responsible, or
to one or more of them.278
This provision certainly does not outline what will happen if a state fails to
provide this declaration. But the use of the verb “may” indicates that the
parties to the ECT decided to depart from the default rule of Article 29 of
tion and exploitation of the natural resources of the sea bed and subsoil, and of the
superjacent waters.
Id.
273. See Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of In-
vestments, China-Port., art. 1, Feb. 3, 1992, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/3362.
274. See Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
China-Port., art. 1(4), Dec. 9, 2005, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/3363.
275. See Acordo Entre a Republica Portuguesa e a Regiao Administrativa Especial de
Macau da Republica Popular da China Sobre a Promocao e Proteccao Reciproca de Investi-
mentos, Mac.-Port., art. 1, May 17, 2000, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/1931.
276. See Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, art. 1(10), 34 ILM 373 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter ECT]. See generally CRINA BALTAG, THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: THE NOTION OF
INVESTOR 9-13 (2012); SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES UNDER THE ENERGY CHAR-
TER TREATY 195-224 (Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold eds., 2011); THOMAS W. WÄLDE,
THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: AN EAST-WEST GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENT AND TRADE
1-33 (1996).
277. See ECT, supra note 276, art. 1(10).
278. Id. art. 40(1) (emphasis added).
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the VCLT, to the extent the default rule here appears to be the non-appli-
cation to all the territories unless so declared.279 In any case, it should be
noted that contracting parties to the ECT that fall within the ambit of the
above provision have made relevant territorial declarations. This includes
Denmark, which made a relevant declaration for Greenland and the Faroe
Islands,280 and the U.K., which, upon ratification, extended the ECT to
Jersey and the Isle of Man281 and shortly thereafter to Guernsey.282
Before the entry into force of the ECT, whereby it was applied provision-
ally,283 the U.K. had also extended the provisional application to Gibral-
tar,284 but whether the treaty still applies to this territory is not entirely
clear.285 In any case, the issue remains similar to that of the territorial
extension of BITs–that is, states that do not want certain IIAs to apply to
their territory make relevant territorial declarations. In addition, the
soundness of this presumption is evident when taking into account that,
under the ECT, the parties have explicitly agreed to reverse the default
rule under Article 29 of the VCLT. Nonetheless, states proceeded with
relevant territorial declarations that mandate the importance and univer-
sal acceptance of customary international law, as is captured by Article 29
of the VCLT.
On balance, it can be established that treaty practice on the territorial
application and extension of IIAs creates a presumption against China, in
an alleged non-application of its IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao.
279. Cf. VCLT, supra note 22, art. 29.
280. See Final Act of the European Energy Charter Conference, Declaration 6(6),
opened for signature Dec. 17, 1994.
281. See Energy Charter Treaty and Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and
Related Environmental Aspects, 78 UK TREATY SERIES (2000) at 72 (U.K. ratified the ECT
on Dec. 16, 1997 and the ECT entered into force on Apr. 16, 1998.
282. See ECT, Declaration of Aug. 11, 1998, http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/treaties/
treatyrecord.htm?tid=3609 (last visited May 11, 2015).
283. ECT, supra note 276, art. 45(1-3). See generally Ulrich Klaus, The Gate to Arbitra-
tion – The Yukos Case the Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty in the Rus-
sian Federation, 2(3) TRANSNA’L DISP. MGMT. (2005); Peter C. Laidlaw, Comment,
Provisional Application of the Energy Charter as Seen in the Yukos Dispute, 52 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 655 (2012); Alex M. Niebruegge, Provisional Application of the Energy Char-
ter Treaty: The Yukos Arbitration and the Future Place of Provisional Application in Interna-
tional Law, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 355, 357 (2007).
284. See ECT, Declaration of Dec. 17, 1994, http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/treaties/
treatyrecord.htm?tid=3609 (last visited May 11, 2015).
285. See Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case
No. AA 226, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 535 (Nov. 30, 2009); Yukos
Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, Interim
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 536 (Nov. 30, 2009); Veteran Petroleum Limited
(Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 228, Interim Award on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, ¶ 521 (Nov. 30, 2009); Petrobart Limited v. The Kyrgyz Republic (U.K.-
Gibraltar), SCC Case No. 126/2003, Arbitral Award, at VIII ¶¶ 2-3 (Mar. 29, 2005), and
Supplementary Opinion of Adnan Amkhan, ¶¶ 5-18 (Dec. 14, 2004); Stati v. Kazakhstan,
SCC Case No. 116/2010, Award, ¶¶ 733-36, 746 (Dec. 19, 2013).
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B. Guidance from Investor-State Cases under Pre-Succession
or Secession IIAs
The discussion on the VCST in Part III revealed that this treaty draws
a tripartite distinction, among: first, newly independent states, i.e. states
emerging from the wave of decolonization; second, cases of state dissolu-
tion and secession not falling in the first category; and third, cases of suc-
cession in part of territory. For newly independent states, the tabula rasa
approach is enshrined as the default option, while for other state dissolu-
tion and secession cases the default approach is that of the automatic ap-
plication of pre-succession or secession IIAs. Lastly, for succession in part
of a territory, as occurred in the cases of Hong Kong and Macao, the de-
fault option is the automatic application of the successor state’s IIAs. As
already noted, the above three cases are distinct under the VCST. Never-
theless, this article finds that due to the similar approach adopted for cases
of state dissolution and secession and succession in part of territory, it
would be constructive to analogize the former cases with the latter
ones.286 For this reason, the following lines examine the application of
BITs concluded by Czechoslovakia, the FRY and the USSR in order to
seek relevant guidance for the issue under examination.287
1. Czechoslovakia
On January 1, 1993, Czechoslovakia was separated into the indepen-
dent states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia.288 At this stage, both
states acceded to the VCST and also decided to apply its provisions retro-
actively.289 In addition, apart from acceding to the VCST, the Czech Re-
public and Slovakia made a series of official declarations and notifications,
including parliamentary and constitutional declarations expressing their
will to adhere to the obligations undertaken by Czechoslovakia, in bilat-
eral and multilateral treaties.290 A series of Exchange of Notes also took
place with parties that previously retained BITs with Czechoslovakia.291
286. See VCST, supra note 23, arts. 15, 34.
287. For Kosovo and South Sudan, see Justin A. Fraterman, Secession, State Succession
and International Arbitration (2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2313401; Alexandre Genest, Sudan Bilateral Investment Treaties and South Sudan: Mus-
ings on State Succession to Bilateral Treaties in the Wake of Yugoslavia’s Breakup, PROVI-
SIONAL TRADITIONAL DISP. MGMT. (Apr. 2014).
288. JAMES R. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 402
(2007).
289. See Declarations of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, https://treaties.un.org/ (last
visited May 20, 2015).
290. Gerhard Hafner & Elisabeth Kornfeind, The Recent Austrian Practice of State Suc-
cession: Does the Clean Slate Rule Still Exist?, 1 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 1, 13
(1996); Dumberry, supra note 158, at 83, nn.54-60.
291. See e.g. Exchange of Notes between Austria and Slovakia (Aug. 4 and Nov. 25,
1994, entered into force on Jan. 1, 1995); Exchange of Letters between the Netherlands and
the Czech Republic (Dec. 8, 1994), 27 TRACTATENBLAD VAN HET KONINKRIJ DER NEDER-
LANDEN (1995), Annex I, at 11; Exchange of Letters between the Netherlands and Slovakia
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This practice generally seems to depart from the “automatic process” en-
shrined in Article 34 of the VCST and has led Patrick Dumberry note that:
the very fact that such negotiation took place and that the contin-
uation of bilateral treaties was agreed by the parties in exchanges
of diplomatic notes suggest that the principle of automatic succes-
sion was actually not adopted by these States in their prac-
tice. [. . .] While it is true that the parties seem to have been
guided by a general presumption of continuity whereby bilateral
treaties should remain in force, they (generally) did not believe
that such continuation was automatic.292
However, this approach has not created problems in relevant arbitral prac-
tice, since the binding force of pre-dissolution BITs were not challenged in
any of the cases filed against the Czech Republic or Slovakia under BITs
concluded by Czechoslovakia.293 Meanwhile, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia have either continued to apply BITs concluded by Czechoslova-
kia294 or have entered into new BITs, thus replacing older ones concluded
(Dec. 9, 1994), 27 TRACTATENBLAD VAN HET KONINKRIJ DER NEDERLANDEN (1995), Annex
I, at 12.
292. Dumberry, supra note 158, at 84.
293. See Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic (formerly Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak
Republic), PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, ¶ 48,
Oct. 26, 2010, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0309.pdf; Achmea
B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2013-12 (Number 2), Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, ¶ 1, May 20, 2014, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw3207.pdf; Alps Finance and Trade AG v. The Slovak Republic, Award, ¶ 1, Mar. 5,
2011, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0027.pdf; Austrian Airlines
v. The Slovak Republic, Final Award, ¶ 8, Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0048_0.pdf; CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, Par-
tial Award, ¶ 3, Sept. 13, 2001, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0178.pdf; Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 088/
2004, Partial Award, ¶ 153 (Mar. 27, 2007, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-doc-
uments/ita0259_0.pdf; European American Investment Bank AG (EURAM) v. Slovak Re-
public, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 40, Oct. 22, 2012, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/italaw4226.pdf; Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, Fi-
nal Award, ¶ 3 (Nov. 12, 2010); HICEE B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2009-11,
Partial Award, ¶ 3, May 23, 2011, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0404_0.pdf; Oostergetel v. The Slovak Republic, ¶ 56, Apr. 30, 2010; Ronald S. Lauder v.
The Czech Republic, Final Award, ¶ 2, Sep. 3, 2001; Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech
Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic’s Counterclaim, ¶ 2, May 7, 2004;
William Nagel v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 049/2002, Award, ¶ 266, Sept. 9, 2003.
294. See generally Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments, Czechoslovakia-Gr., June 3, 1991, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/936; Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments, Czecho-
slovakia-Nor., May 21, 1991, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/
970; Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Czechoslova-
kia-Neth., Apr. 29, 1991, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/968;
Agreement Concerning the Protection and Reciprocal Encouragement of Investments,
Czechoslovakia-Spain, Dec. 12, 1990, 1669 U.N.T.S. 276; Agreement on the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments (with Protocol), Czechoslovakia-Swed., Nov. 13, 1990,
1692 U.N.T.S. 461; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Czechoslo-
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by Czechoslovakia.295 All the above indicates that, for those treaties con-
cluded by Czechoslovakia, a smooth transition took place, despite depart-
ing from the default “automatic” approach of Article 34 of the VCST.
2. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
The FRY was a state that emerged after the dissolution of the Former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1992.296 In 2003, the
FRY was reconstituted as the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
(SUSM).297 Eventually, this entity ceased to exist in 2006, when Montene-
gro declared its independence, and Serbia continued its legal personal-
ity.298 This has also been affirmed in the Mytilineos case that was filed
vakia-Fin., Nov. 6, 1990, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/933;
Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austria-Czechoslova-
kia, Oct. 15, 1990, 1653 U.N.T.S. 27; Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection
of Investments, Czechoslovakia-Switz., Oct. 5, 1990, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/985; Dohoda medzi Ceskou a Slovenskou Federativnou Republikou a
Spolkovou republikou Nemecko o podpore a vzajomenej ochrane investicii, Czechoslovakia-
Ger., Oct. 2, 1990, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3015; Ac-
corde Entre la Republique francaise et la Republique Federative Tcheque et Slovaque sur
l’encouragement et la Protection Reciproques des Investissements, Czechoslovakia-Fr., Sept.
13, 1990, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/934; Agreement for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Czechoslovakia-U.K., July 10, 1990, http://invest
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/993; Agreement for the Promotion and Re-
ciprocal Protection of Investments, Czechoslovakia-Den., Mar. 6, 1990 http://investmentpoli
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/929 (terminated Nov. 18, 2009); Agreement Concern-
ing the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Belg.-Czechoslovakia-Lux.,
Apr. 24, 1989, 1957 U.N.T.S. 482.
295. See generally Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-
Slovk., July 20, 2010, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/634;
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Czech., May 6, 2009,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/606; Agreement on the Promo-
tion and Protection of Investments, China-Czech., Dec. 8, 2005, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/725; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Can.-Slovk., Feb. 3, 1997, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/
35/treaty/800 (terminated Jan. 30, 2001); Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investments, Austl.-Czech., Sept. 30, 1993, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/149; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Can.-Czechoslovakia, Nov. 15, 1990, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/607 (terminated Mar. 9, 1992); China-Czechoslovakia BIT, supra note 37; Agree-
ment on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-Czechoslovakia,
July 29, 1991, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/150.
296. See CRAWFORD, supra note 288, at 187-89; see also Declaration on a New Yugosla-
via, Adopted by the Participants on the Joint Session of the SFRY Assembly, the National
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro, Apr.
27, 1992, UN Doc. S/23877.
297. See Agreement on Principles of Relations Between Serbia and Montenegro Within
the Framework of a Union of States (Mar. 14, 2002).
298. CRAWFORD, supra note 288, at 712.
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under the Greece-FRY BIT299 against both the SUSM and Serbia.300 In-
terestingly enough, this claim was submitted in 2004, but by the time the
award was rendered, Montenegro had declared its independence and Ser-
bia had undertaken to continue the legal personality of the SUSM. How-
ever, the tribunal, adhering to the Arrest Warrant case,301 found that the
critical date was that of the institution of arbitration proceedings, i.e. April
8, 2005.302 At that stage, the SUSM still existed. Therefore, adopting the
above approach, the tribunal denied jurisdiction on the part of Serbia,
opining that:
Since by the treaty’s plain wording Serbia, as a constituent part of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), is
not a Contracting Party, it cannot be made the subject of arbitra-
tion proceedings under the BIT.303
However, this case did not deal with the application of pre-succession or
secession IIAs against successor or seceding states.304 This issue is of vital
importance for the application of BITs concluded by the FRY or the
SUSM to Montenegro. In this regard, both Serbia and Montenegro rati-
fied the VCST but did not apply it retroactively as the Czech Republic and
Slovakia chose to.305 Nevertheless, while Article 34 of the VCST adopts
the approach of automatic continuity, as applicable to Montenegro’s seces-
sion, the treaty practice of Serbia and Montenegro departed from this ap-
proach, without however being always entirely clear.
For Serbia, by continuing the legal personality of the SUSM, explicitly
accepted the binding character of BITs concluded by the FRY or the
SUSM, but made no representations for the part of Montenegro. For ex-
ample, an Exchange of Notes between the U.K. and the Republic of Ser-
bia has amended the U.K.-FRY BIT to refer to the Serbia alone but
nevertheless does not provide any guidance for its application to
Montenegro.306
299. See generally Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments, Gr.-Serb., June 25, 1997, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/
1478.
300. Mytilineos Holdings SA v. The State Union of Serbia & Montenegro and Republic
of Serbia, Partial Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 158 (Sept. 8, 2006).
301. Id. ¶ 159 (referring to Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), Feb. 14, 2002, ICJ REP. 1, ¶ 26 (2002)).
302. Mytilineos v. SUSM & Serbia, ¶ 163.
303. Id. ¶ 172.
304. The case will most likely be dealt with in the second case filed by Mytilineos
against Serbia alone. See Mytilineos Holdings SA v. Republic of Serbia, Notice of Arbitra-
tion, Sept. 18, 2013.
305. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Vienna Convention on Succession of
States in Respect of Treaties, (1978), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src
=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-2&chapter=23&lang=EN (last accessed on May 20, 2015).
306. See Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment (with
the Exchange of Notes), Serb.-U.K., May 13, 2010.
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Montenegro is currently facing two investment claims, one under the
Cyprus-Serbia and Montenegro BIT of 2005 and another under the
Netherlands-FRY BIT of 2002.307 In connection to these proceedings, it is
crucial to note that Montenegro has accepted the application of the Cy-
prus-Serbia and Montenegro BITs through an Exchange of Notes with Cy-
prus.308 The same has occurred for the Netherlands-FRY BIT.309 While
this may dispel any doubts regarding the application of the above treaties
to Montenegro, it still remains the case that such treaty practice departs
from the otherwise automatic process of Article 34 of the VCST. Thus,
similar to the case of Czechoslovakia, Montenegro’s practice opts for an
explicit agreement, detached from the approach adopted in the VCST.
Such approach can also prove of crucial importance for a claim currently
filed against Kosovo under the Germany-FRY BIT.310
3. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
At the outset, it should be noted that, with the dissolution of the
USSR on December 26, 1991, the USSR ceased to exist, and the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established.311 However,
while both the Declaration of Alma Ata and the Minsk Agreement pro-
vide that the USSR ceases to exist,312 the international community ac-
cepted that Russia would be the successor state of the USSR.313
Subsequent investor-state tribunals dealing with claims against Russia
307. CEAC Holdings Limited v. Montenegro, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/8 (registered
on Mar. 20, 2014); MNSS B.V. and Recupero Credito Acciaio N.V. v. Montenegro, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/12/8 (registered on Dec. 6, 2012).
308. Exchange of Notes between the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the
Government of the Republic of Montenegro on the application of the Agreement between
the Republic of Cyprus and Serbia and Montenegro on the Reciprocal Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investments, July 21, 2005 (Oct. 3 and 15, 2008, entered into force on Nov. 5, 2008),
COG S.VII 4036, Nov. 30, 2005, at 573.
309. See Exchange of Notes between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic
of Montenegro Regarding the Continuation of Bilateral Treaties (Nov. 15, 2006 and Jan. 18,
2007), 51 TRACTATENBLAD VAN HET KONINKRIJ DER NEDERLANDEN (2007), Nr. I, at 8.
310. ACP Axos Capital GmbH v. Republic of Kosovo.
311. Declaration of Alma Ata, Dec. 21, 1991, UN Doc. A/46/60, 31 ILM 147 (1992)
[hereinafter Declaration of Alma Ata]; The Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of
Independent States, Dec. 13, 1991, UN Doc. A/46/771, 31 ILM 138 (1992) [hereinafter Minsk
Agreement].
312. See Minsk Agreement, supra note 311 (“[T]he Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
as a subject of international law and as a geopolitical reality no longer exists.”); Yehuda Z.
Blum, Russia Takes Over the Soviet Union’s Seat at the United Nation, 3 EUROPEAN J. INT’L
L. 354, 355 (1992) (“With the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceases to exist.”).
313. Letter of Russia’s President Yeltsin to the United Nations Secretary-General, Dec.
24, 1991, 31 ILM 138 (1992); Decision by the Council of Heads of State of the Common-
wealth of Independent States, Dec. 21, 1991, 31 ILM 151 (1992); see also Tarja Langstrom,
The Dissolution of the Soviet Union in the Light of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession
of States in Respect of Treaties, in STATE SUCCESSION: CODIFICATION TESTED AGAINST THE
FACTS 723, 723-79 (Pierre Michel Eisemann & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2000); Hafner &
Kornfeind, supra note 290, at 11-12; Paul R. Williams, The Treaty Obligations of the Successor
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under USSR BITs have also confirmed this.314 However, the question that
arises is whether BITs concluded by the USSR could also apply to other
former Soviet Socialist Republics. This is of particular importance when
taking into account that Kazakhstan is currently facing a claim by World
Wide Minerals under the Canada-USSR BIT.315 In this regard, the VCST
would again seem to suggest that, in principle, such application should be
automatic. However, this can prove extremely controversial. The claim of
World Wide Minerals against Kazakhstan could probably find support in
the Alma Ata Declaration, which in relevant space provides: “Member
states of the commonwealth guarantee, in accordance with their constitu-
tional procedures, the fulfillment of international obligations stemming
from the treaties and agreements of the former U.S.S.R.”316 Additionally,
the preamble of a trade agreement between Kazakhstan and Canada pro-
vides that the parties are referring to “the Agreement for the Promotion
and Protection of Investments of November 20, 1989.”317 In any however
case, the above issue does not make it entirely clear that USSR BITs will
also apply to other former Soviet Socialist Republics “automatically.”
As a general comment, this article finds that, in practice, there appears
a huge divide between what is otherwise enshrined in the VCST and what
states decide to do. Thus, treaty practice on the territorial application of
pre-succession or secession IIAs should generally be found relevant to
cases of succession to territory, to the extent the automaticity of the VCST
is not followed in actual circumstances. Nevertheless, the above findings
refer to cases of state dissolution or secession that should not be confused
with cases of succession in part of territory. Perhaps more decisive is the
examination of the Exchange of Letters discussed below.
States of the Former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia: Do They Continue in
Force?, 23 DENVER J. INT. LAW POL. 1, 3 (1994).
314. See Berschader v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 080/2004, Award, ¶ 161
(Apr. 21, 2006), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0080_0.pdf;
Renta 4 S.V.S.A v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 24/2007, Award on Preliminary
Objections, ¶ 4 (Mar. 20, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0714.pdf; RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. V079/2005,
Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 31 (Oct. 7, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-docu
ments/ita0719.pdf; Sedelmayer v. The Russian Federation, SCC, Award, 17-45 (July 7, 1998),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0757.pdf.
315. See World Wide Minerals v. Kazakhstan, supra note 27; see also Agreement on the
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-U.S.S.R., Nov. 20, 1989, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/632; Luke Eric Peterson, After Failure
of Claim Under Kazakh Statute, Canadian Miner Hopes that USSR-Canada Investment Treaty
Permits Arbitration with Kazakhstan, Dec. 18, 2013, http://www.iareporter.com/articles/
20131218 (last visited May 25, 2015).
316. See Declaration of Alma Ata, supra note 312.
317. Trade Agreement, Can.-Kaz., E100670 - CTS 1997 No. 19, Mar. 29, 1995, http://
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C. Between Treaty Interpretation and Subsequent Agreements or
What the SGHC Missed
It was earlier shown that the SGHC found that the Exchange of Let-
ters between the Laotian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China’s Embassy
in Vientiane constituted a subsequent agreement under Article 31 of the
VCLT.318 However, in referring to the temporal effects of this Exchange,
the SGHC noted that it did not have a retroactive effect, and was merely
“an affirmation of the common understanding,”319 “a confirmation of the
status quo rather than a dramatic upheaval of the current expectations
held by states that have treaties with PRC.”320 This article finds that the
justification of the SGHC is not adequate in this regard since, as already
indicated, it fails to consider the temporal effect of such an Exchange of
Letters. For, if the latter is a subsequent modification rather than a subse-
quent interpretation, it will not have a retroactive effect, as there were no
stipulations to the contrary.321
However, even accepting that the Exchange of Letters was a subse-
quent interpretation, thus having ipso facto retroactive effect, it would not
necessarily mean that this Exchange could affect pending and, as in the
present case, concluded investor-state arbitrations. This can be explained
by reference to the mechanism of investor-state arbitration, whereby an
arbitration clause inserted in IIAs acts as an offer to consent to arbitrate
that becomes perfected once accepted by the foreign investor.322 In addi-
tion, once consent is perfected, neither the investor nor the respondent
state can unilaterally withdraw it.323 However, what is disputed is whether
the investor’s home state and the respondent state could agree to termi-
nate pending or even concluded investor-state claims.324 This then argua-
318. Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Sanum Investments Ltd.,
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211-14; ANDREA MARCO STEINGRUBER, CONSENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 202-03
(2012); Christoph Schreuer, Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and Consent to Arbitra-
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323. See, e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note 14, art. 25(1); Report of the Executive
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tertemporality and International Investment Arbitration: Protecting the Jurisdiction of Estab-
lished Tribunals, 31 ARB. INT’L 213, 233-57 (2015).
324. See Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Invest-
ment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 90-92 (2013); Anthea Roberts, Power and Persua-
sion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179
(2010); Anthea Roberts, State-To-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of
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bly leads to the discussion of the nature of investor rights and the powers
and limits of the contacting states to affect these rights.325 Regardless, it is
submitted that a subsequent modification as well as interpretation should
generally not affect pending cases or even cases that have already been
concluded, such as Sanum.326
Furthermore, a closer look at the SGHC’s decision reveals that there
also exists another aspect that is noteworthy and to a certain degree de-
parts from the discussion on the nature of investor rights. This has to do
with the approach of the SGHC. This approach neither distinguished be-
tween the temporal effects of a subsequent modification and interpreta-
tion nor discussed the issue of perfected consent, but it nevertheless
employed the terms “affirmation” and “confirmation.”327 Reflecting upon
this wording and the passage quoted above, it appears that the SGHC was
of the view that the Exchange of Letters was a mere affirmation, “a confir-
mation of the status quo.”328 Thus, according to the SGHC, the status quo
was that the China-Laos BIT never applied to Macao.
In connection to this issue, it is noteworthy to refer to the position
adopted by Mahnoush H. Arsanjani and Professor W. Michael Reisman in
connection to the preparatory work of a treaty in investment arbitra-
tion.329 Certainly, the travaux préparatoires constitute a supplementary
means of interpretation employed in order to confirm the meaning result-
ing from the application of Article 31 of the VCLT or when interpretation
according to the latter Article “leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure”
Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARVARD INT’L L. J. 1 (2014);
Tania Voon, Andrew Mitchell & James Munro, Parting Ways: The Impact of Investor Rights
on Mutual Termination of Investment Treaties, 29 ICSID REV. 451 (2014).
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TERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
155, 155-78 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Panos Merkouris eds., 2013); Francisco González de
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326. See generally Fry & Repousis, supra note 324, at 233-254; see also Rahim Moloo,
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or leads “to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”330 How-
ever, the above authors discuss a recent decision wherein it was stated
that:
[i]n any event, courts and tribunals interpreting treaties regularly
review the travaux preparatoires whenever they are brought to
their attention; it is mythological to pretend that they do so only
when they first conclude that the term requiring interpretation is
ambiguous or obscure.331
While the authors do not contest the veracity of this statement, they ask
whether it is “appropriate to introduce ‘intentions’ of drafters that are not
manifest in the agreement itself” when “the agreement is designed to in-
duce reliance and good faith investment of values by third parties that
took no part in its negotiation.”332 And they conclude their line of argu-
ment by further rhetorically asking:
When treaties are designed to induce private parties that did not
participate in the negotiations to rely upon their terms and to do
specific things, fundamental principles of legality argue, even
more, for fidelity to a method based on the text and on those post-
text events that are available to the parties and are expressive of
their agreement. When treaties are designed to influence the be-
havior of private entities -one thinks of the almost twenty-seven
hundred bilateral investment treaties- will they achieve their pur-
pose if those to whom they are directed believe that the rules of
interpretation allow textual meanings to be challenged on the ba-
sis of internal documents that either are unavailable to them or, in
the case of multilateral treaties, difficult to find?333
While the Exchange of Letters in the Sanum case is certainly not an inter-
nal document or a preparatory one, this article finds that the case dis-
cussed by Arsanjani and Reisman is very analogous. For if the contracting
parties to an investment treaty could at any point challenge textual mean-
ings by reference to their initial intent, this would arguably lead to the
same inconsistency. Indeed, initial intent is, in itself, “internal” and pre-
mised on a certain understanding allegedly present at the time an invest-
ment treaty was negotiated and concluded.
At the same time, the reconstruction of such initial intent is fraught
with difficulty, given that preparatory documents are either unavailable or
unreachable to the investor, as is exactly the case with Sanum. This means
that the investor has to determine the initial intent of the contracting par-
330. VCLT, supra note 22, art. 32.
331. Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 330, at 597 (citing Malaysian Historical Salvors,
SDN, BHD v. The Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the
Application for Annulment, ¶ 57 (Apr. 16, 2009)).
332. Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 330, at 602.
333. Id. at 604.
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ties based on the plain text of the investment treaty. If the contracting
parties decide to change the textual meanings of such treaty by reference
to their alleged initial intent, this should not affect pending or concluded
cases, as it directly goes against the predictability investment treaties
should radiate, as well as the mechanism of perfected consent discussed
above. These issues might seem subtle, but they are in fact crucial and
merit discussion by the SGHC.
D. A Note on Devolution
In examining the legal nature of the China-Portugal Joint Declaration,
the UNCITRAL tribunal found that this was a devolution treaty that had
no binding effect on third parties such as Laos.334 To underpin its reason-
ing, the tribunal referred to the relative effect of treaties and also ex-
pressed the view that an inter partes derogation from a customary
international law rule, such as that enshrined in Article 15 of the VCST or
29 of the VCLT, cannot bind third parties, unless they so specifically con-
sent to be bound by it.335 Strikingly, the SGHC did not discuss the matter,
although it was aware of the UNCITRAL tribunal’s reasoning. This cre-
ates the need to further appraise the approach adopted by the UNCI-
TRAL tribunal and to examine whether the SGHC’s complete defiance of
this resolution was justified.
At the outset, it should be noted that the matter of devolution treaties
is dealt with in Article 8 of the VCST, which reads as follows:
1. The obligations or rights of a predecessor State under treaties in
force in respect of a territory at the date of a succession of States
do not become the obligations or rights of the successor State to-
wards other States Parties to those treaties by reason only of the
fact that the predecessor State and the successor State have con-
cluded an agreement providing that such obligations or rights
shall devolve upon the successor State.
2. Notwithstanding the conclusion of such an agreement, the ef-
fects of a succession of States on treaties which, at the date of that
succession of States, were in force in respect of the territory in
question are governed by the present Convention.336
In practice, devolution treaties are treaties designed to devolve (as-
sign) obligations and rights of the predecessor state to the successor state,
which obligations and rights stem from “treaties formerly applicable in re-
spect of the territory concerned.”337 Such devolution treaties have gener-
334. Sanum Inv. Ltd. v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PCA Case No. 2013-13,
Award on Jurisdiction ¶¶ 258-59, 264-69 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/italaw3322.pdf.
335. Id. ¶¶ 265-68.
336. VCST, supra note 23, art. 8. For the drafting history of Art. 8, see Szafarz, Vienna
Convention, supra note 137, at 80-84.
337. VCST Commentary, supra note 142, art. 8, ¶ 1.
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ally been used in connection with “newly independent states,” to use the
terminology of the VCST, i.e. between ex-colonial powers and states that
emerged from the decolonization wave.338 Therefore, what is apparent
from Article 8 of the VCST is that devolution treaties do not ipso facto
bind third parties, and regardless of their conclusion, issues of state succes-
sion with respect to treaties continue to be governed by the provisions of
the VCST. As Renata Szafarz has eloquently put it,
by attaching greater significance to devolution agreements and
unilateral declarations than is the case in the Convention, one
would, as a matter of fact, on the one hand, undermine the princi-
ple of ipso jure continuity of treaties as applied in the context of
uniting and separation of States, and on the other hand, restrict
the action of the so-called clean slate principle applicable in case
of newly independent States.339
The same should arguably apply to the third distinct category of succession
in respect of part of territory that is exactly the case with Hong Kong and
Macao. In fact, Roda Mushkat has questioned the effect of the China-U.K.
Joint Declaration on third parties as early as 1985.340 In any case, what the
VCST, its Commentary, state practice, and theory suggest is that devolu-
tion treaties do not bind third states unless they specifically agree to be
bound by them.341 Absent such express agreement, for third states, devo-
lution treaties remain nothing more than res inter alios acta.342
338. For the practice of the UK and France, see generally Okon Udokang, Succession to
Treaties in New States, 8 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 123, 134-50 (1970).
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The Joint Declarations for Hong Kong and Macao certainly contain a
devolution aspect to the extent that they novated the application of trea-
ties concluded by the U.K. and Portugal to Hong Kong and Macao respec-
tively on China’s accession to these territories. While this devolution is
somewhat different from those agreements “widely used by ex-British ter-
ritories on attaining independence,” there are no good reasons not to ac-
cept what has generally been stated above, namely that third parties will
generally not be bound by devolution treaties unless otherwise agreed.343
However, the crucial part in this discussion is not the application of U.K.
and Portuguese treaties to third parties, but the application of China’s
treaties to Hong Kong and Macao. While traditional devolution treaties do
not deal with these issues, since they mainly involve a predecessor state
and a newly independent state, the Joint Declarations for Hong Kong and
Macao deal with both the application of U.K. and Portuguese treaties
(classic devolution aspect) and the application of Chinese treaties.
However, this does not suffice to alter the legal nature of the Joint
Declarations as res inter alios acta that in principle do not bind third par-
ties, such as Laos. This outcome is also supported by the Commentary to
the VCST according to which the UNSG’s practice with regard to multilat-
eral treaties “begun by attributing largely automatic effects to devolution
agreements” but has “evolved afterwards in the direction of regarding
them rather as a general expression of intention”344 and has also not at-
tributed automatic effects to their publication in the UN Treaty Series.345
The same is arguably applicable to bilateral treaties, such as the Joint Dec-
larations for Hong Kong and Macao.346
The above analysis indicates that the legal nature and effect of the
Joint Declarations is an issue that merited discussion and should not have
been overlooked by the SGHC.
E. Parallelism and Territoriality
Finally, it has already been noted that the issue of parallelism is an-
other factor that can potentially affect the territorial application of China’s
IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao. It was earlier shown that the tribunals in
Tza Yap Shum and Sanum discussed the issue and expressed the view that
the conclusion of BITs by Hong Kong and Macao does not necessarily
preclude the application of Chinese IIAs since the former are also de-
signed to cover non-Chinese investors.347 On the other hand, while the
SGHC did not find that Macao’s capacity to enter into its own BITs auto-
343. Schaffer, supra note 341, at 597.
344. VCST Commentary, supra note 142, art. 8, ¶ 12.
345. Id. art. 8, ¶ 13.
346. For a different approach as the one adopted by the VCST Commentary, see Keith,
supra note 151, at 540-41; Schaffer, supra note 341, at 599, 602.
347. Sanum Inv. Ltd. v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PCA Case No. 2013-13,
Award on Jurisdiction ¶ 290-95 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italaw3322.pdf; Señor Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence ¶ 76 (June 19, 2009).
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matically precludes the application of China’s BITs it nevertheless found
that parallelism “to a limited extent” tends to suggest so.348 In light of
these differing approaches, this section briefly summarizes parallelism in
China’s investment treaty practice in order to reveal that the approach of
the SGHC is not supported by the facts.
Thus, by way of summary, with regard to China there exists parallel-
ism in three specific cases. First, the FTAs, with Pakistan, Peru, New Zea-
land, Korea and Australia that include investment chapters with investor-
state arbitration clauses exist in parallel with China’s BITs with these
countries.349 Second, China’s BITs with each of the ten ASEAN members
exist in parallel with the China-ASEAN Agreement on Investment.350
Third, the China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement exists in
parallel with the China-Japan and China-Korea BITs as well as with the
China-Korea FTA.351 With regard to Hong Kong, parallelism exists be-
tween the EFTA-Hong Kong FTA and the Switzerland-Hong Kong BIT,
but the former does not include an investor-state arbitration clause.352
Regarding the IIAs of China, Hong Kong and Macao, China has con-
cluded BITs with each and every country with which these two SARs have
entered into BITs.353 In addition, the Hong Kong-New Zealand BIT can
be examined in parallel with the China-New Zealand BIT and FTA,354
and the Hong Kong-Japan and Hong Kong-Korea BITs, in parallel with
the China-Japan BIT, the China-Korea BIT and FTA, but also the China-
Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement.355 In the same vein, the
Thailand-Hong Kong BIT can be examined in parallel with the China-
Thailand BIT and the China-ASEAN Agreement on Investment356 and
348. Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Sanum Investments Ltd.,
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the EFTA-Hong Kong FTA with the Switzerland-Hong Kong BIT and the
China-Iceland, China-Switzerland and China-Norway BITs.357
Therefore, what is the impact that the above parallelism can create in
determining the application of China’s IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao?
The analysis of the “territorial” stipulations found in Hong Kong and Ma-
cao BITs do not appear to provide any conclusive evidence with regard to
the application of China’s IIAs. On the other hand, certain stipulations
found in China’s IIAs, could be interpreted in favor of their non-applica-
tion to Hong Kong and Macao when examined in light of the above paral-
lelism. For instance, that could be the case with the notes included in the
China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement when read in con-
junction with the texts of the China-Japan, China-Korea, Hong Kong-Ja-
pan, and Hong Kong-Korea BITs. Similarly, China’s FTAs that include
investment chapters, such as the China-Peru FTA that refers to China’s
“customs territory,” could potentially impact the territorial scope of the
China-Peru BIT.
In any case, parallelism should not be regarded as conclusive, but in-
stead as another relevant element, bearing due regard to all other cases
(the majority) in which a parallel investment treaty does not exist.358 That
is not to say that parallelism “tends to suggest” that China’s IIAs do not
apply to Macao, as the SGHC put it. On the contrary, it shows that
China’s treaty practice in many regards favors parallelism and does not
seek to restrict it in any manner. Regardless, this pervasive parallelism
should be approached with caution and should always be examined in con-
creto and on an ad hoc basis.
IMPLICATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES: A CONCLUSION
This article has examined the application of China’s IIAs to Hong
Kong and Macao having due regard to the rulings of the UNCITRAL tri-
bunal and the SGHC in Sanum. In a nutshell, the examination of these
rulings vis-à-vis a wide array of considerations reveals that the application
of China’s IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao is not settled, even after the
decision of the SGHC. In summary, the following points can be made:
• A very small number of China’s IIAs specifically carve out Hong Kong
and Macao from their application.
• China’s territory under WTO law is only relevant for those IIAs that
specifically refer to China’s “customs territory.”
• The China-UK and China-Portugal Joint Declarations are bilateral
(devolution) treaties that in principle do not bind third states.
357. See EFTA-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 104; China-Switzerland BIT, supra note
17; Hong Kong-Switzerland BIT, supra note 104; China-Iceland BIT, supra note 37; China-
Norway BIT, supra note 31.
358. Another issue that deserves attention is that even though parallelism may be exis-
tent, the parallel IIAs might not provide guidance with regard to the notion of “territory.”
See, e.g., Hong Kong-Thailand BIT, supra note 104; China-Thailand BIT, supra note 31.
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• The Hong Kong and Macao Basic Laws belong to the sphere of
China’s internal laws.
• China’s Notes to the UNSG in respect of Hong Kong and Macao can
only provide guidance for those multilateral treaties the UNSG acts as
Depositary and not for bilateral and multilateral investment treaties.
• The ICSID Convention applies to both Hong Kong and Macao.
• While China has entered into IIAs with states that have a coherent
practice on territorial extensions, such as the UK, Netherlands and
Denmark, it has consistently avoided adopting a similar practice.
• An analogy with the application of pre-succession or secession IIAs to
cases of state dissolution and secession seems to suggest a divide be-
tween actual treaty practice and what is otherwise enshrined in the
VCST. In this regard, this analogy can have an ambivalent effect.
• The Exchange of Letters between the Laotian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs and China’s Embassy in Laos appears to be restricted to the
China-Laos BIT.
• The effect of such Exchange of Letters can be highly disputed espe-
cially when considering the mechanism of perfected consent in inves-
tor-state arbitration.
• China’s IIAs have created a burgeoning parallelism that China has in
no way sought to delimit in light also of the BITs concluded by Hong
Kong and Macao.
These points illustrate that the application of China’s IIAs to Hong
Kong and Macao is an issue of great ambiguity and is therefore not suscep-
tible of being expressed in terms of a fixed Procrustean rule. At the same
time, they reveal that absent any further developments, providers of legal
services will face a Sisyphean task in advising potential clients. Likewise,
future investor-state tribunals will need to exercise extreme caution and
seek clarifications in order to avoid repetition of the “Sanum effect.”
Regardless, of these concerns and the pervasive uncertainty stemming
from China’s ambiguous treaty practice, this article has endeavored to ful-
fill a threefold task. First, it provides a roadmap for an objective appraisal
and confrontation of the issue at hand, namely the application of China’s
IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao. Second, it stresses the importance of cer-
tain crucial issues, as is the case with the legal nature of the Joint Declara-
tions. Finally, this article has sought to enrich this discussion by drawing
analogies and inferences from relevant treaty practice.
